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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 29, 2001, just outside Klamath Falls, Oregon, an angry mob of 
farmers took actions into their own hands. Massing around the closed 
headgates of a federally operated irrigation ditch, the crowd defied federal 
government orders, burst open the headgate locks, and returned the flow of 
water to the thirsty soils of their croplands.1 The mob stayed put and made 
camp for the next few days, challenging federal officials time after time by 
unlocking the gates as soon as they had been closed. The crowd finally 
was dispersed under the stern direction of United States Marshals. The 
battle lines could not have been more clearly drawn. The farmers cried for 
relief from dry irrigation ditches and the specter of failed crops. The 
federal government stood firm: the gates had to stay shut and farmlands go 
dry in order to save endangered fish dependent on the water stored in 
Upper Klamath Lake and flowing in the Klamath River. The following 
March, however, amidst the flash of news cameras, the Secretary of 
Agriculture and Secretary of the Interior quite publicly opened the very 
same headgates.2 What made the first liberation of water an act of civil 
disobedience and the latter a high-profile case of wise federal governance? 
Improbably, the answer came from a room full of scientists and a practice 
called peer review.  
This saga, popularly known as “the Klamath,” made headlines around 
the nation and served as a rallying call for many communities in the 
Western United States concerned about the future in the face of “their 
water” being dedicated to endangered species protection.3 The standoff 
had been building ever since two local species of sucker fish found in the 
lake and a population of coho salmon found in the river below the dam 
had been listed for protection under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).4 
This placed the fish under the watchful protection of the federal 
government.5 When the government declared that the fish could no longer 
 1. For an account of the events described in this paragraph, see Ted Williams, Salmon Stakes, 
105 AUDUBON 42 (2003), available at http://magazine.audubon.org/incite/incite0303.html. For a 
comprehensive history of the Klamath River Basin and the events involving the “crisis of 2001,” see 
Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 279 (2003). 
 2. See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 11, at 334–35.
 3. See id. at 321–24.  
 4. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44, and in other scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 5. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for the suckers, and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for the salmon. For a description of the 
regulatory and other authorities FWS and NOAA administer under the ESA, see infra notes 48–65 and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/1
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tolerate the release of water from the lake for irrigation,6 angry farmers 
around the Klamath took charge, transforming the conflict into “Exhibit 
Number One” for critics of the ESA and their charge that agencies work 
on the basis of so-called “junk science.”7 As closely as the popular press 
followed both these developments, however, it completely missed the 
other consequence of the Klamath story, one that we believe has proven 
far more significant—the rise of regulatory peer review.  
The collision of two important but conflicting federal regulatory 
policies—providing a secure supply of irrigation water to Western farmers 
versus providing the same water to endangered fish in Western lakes and 
rivers—led to stalemate, and the federal government turned to peer review 
to break the tie. Following the public outcry over the “fish-versus-
humans” decision and the standoff between farmers and federal officials at 
the floodgates, the National Research Council (NRC), an arm of the 
National Academy of Science, was requested to convene a committee of 
experts, known as the Klamath Committee, to conduct a peer review of the 
agencies’ decisions—the first ever conducted of an agency decision of this 
magnitude under the ESA.8  
accompanying text.  
 6. Specifically, according to FWS and NOAA, further releases would have violated the ESA’s 
provision that each federal agency “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such 
agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 316–20. 
 7. See Daniel J. McGarvey & Brett Marshall, Making Sense of Scientists and “Sound Science”: 
Truth and Consequences for Endangered Species in the Klamath Basin and Beyond, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
73, 79–80 (2005). The National Research Council’s Committee on Endangered and Threatened Fishes 
in the Klamath River Basin (Klamath Committee) also was the target of much criticism, including 
from scientists hired by different interest groups involved in the battle for water, and the situation soon 
deteriorated into what some observers referred to as “combat biology.” Robert F. Service, “Combat 
Biology” on the Klamath, SCIENCE, Apr. 2003, at 36, 36. The lack of established structure for carrying 
out the peer review probably contributed to the ways in which the findings were used and abused—one 
reason for our proposal, infra Part VI.  
 8. J.B. Ruhl was a member of the Klamath Committee. The Klamath Committee provided a 
report thoroughly studying the area’s land use and water management history. See COMM. ON 
ENDANGERED & THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND 
STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY 46–94 (2004) [hereinafter KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT]. The 
Klamath Committee also provided detail in an interim report. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & 
THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC 
EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH 
RIVER BASIN: INTERIM REPORT (2002) [hereinafter KLAMATH COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT]. 
Additional background and analysis of the events surrounding the Klamath can be found in Reed D. 
Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered 
Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2002); Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino 
Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why It (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 441 (2004); Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 1; McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 7; Julia 
Muedeking, Note, Taking the Heart of the Klamath Basin: Is It Free?, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 217 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The initial results of the Klamath Committee’s peer review sparked a 
firestorm of controversy.9 Reviewing the information available to the 
federal agencies responsible for managing the fish at the time of their 
respective decisions, the experts found that “no substantial scientific 
foundation” existed for the agencies’ conclusions.10 In other words, the 
conclusions that further reducing lake levels would jeopardize the suckers 
and that reducing river flows would harm the salmon could not be justified 
based on the available data. Releasing irrigation waters might harm the 
endangered fish, or it might not—the science was too uncertain to say. 
Simply put, the agencies said that the science got them from point A to 
point B, but the Klamath Committee concluded it did not. Soon after, the 
floodgates were dramatically re-opened.  
After the Klamath Committee issued its opinion, many observers began 
to ask whether peer review should guide decisions in other regulatory 
settings. Indeed, since the Klamath controversy, strong, insistent calls for 
improving agency decisions based on science have been heard from the 
White House11 and from Congress.12 This self-proclaimed “sound 
science” movement argues that procedural safeguards to ensure better use 
of scientific data will improve agency decisions.13 Ensuring the proper 
(2003); Cori S. Parobek, Note, Of Farmers’ Takes and Fishes’ Takings: Fifth Amendment 
Compensation Claims When the Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide, 27 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2003). 
 9. See Doremus and Tarlock, supra note 1, at 326. 
 10. Id. at 4 (finding no scientific evidence supporting requirement of increased lake levels or 
increased stream flow). 
 11. The Bush Administration has aggressively advanced this agenda through means such as 
prescribing standards for agency data quality control. See, e.g., Guidelines for Ensuring and 
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal 
Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002); see generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
SUMMARY OF FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST, 34 Env’t Rep. (BNA) S-17, S-112 to S-121 (Feb. 
3, 2003) (including “Goal 8,” which the agency described as “Sound Science, Improved 
Understanding of Environmental Risk, and Greater Innovation to Address Environmental Problems”). 
 12. Legislative proposals routinely use the “sound science” label to gain support. See, e.g., Sound 
Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2003, H.R. 1662, 108th Cong. (2003); Sound 
Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002, H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 13. See David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics, 
Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 498 (2004) 
(“[S]chisms exist over how science is used in setting environmental policy. For most critics of 
environmental regulation, broad reliance on science is viewed as progress towards increased rationality 
and objectivity.”). A comprehensive overview of the sound science debate is found in Thomas O. 
McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies 
for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 897 (2004). A more entertaining, though studiously documented account is available in 
CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005). The discussion and debate regarding the 
use of “sound science” in environmental law is pervasive—we found over 39,000 web sites through a 
Google search of “‘sound science’ AND ‘environmental law.’” For a historical perspective on the use 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/1
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basis for agency decisions has, of course, been a concern of administrative 
procedures since the New Deal.14 But the focus of administrative law for 
agencies’ use of science has been the prevention of abusive practices, such 
as suppression or manipulation of data, not the quality of the data 
themselves. The focus of interested parties has been to expose these 
practices, and that of judges has been to halt them when they amount to 
arbitrary and capricious actions or an abuse of discretion.15 Yet the sound 
science movement seeks more than the traditional protections afforded by 
these conventions of administrative law. Its claim is that agencies will use 
better science when they are required to employ the scientific method as 
their decision making protocol.16 More specifically, just as peer review is 
one of the principal components of the scientific method, it has become 
one of the principal demands of the “sound science” agenda.17  
Scientific peer review is generally described as a rigorous review and 
critique of a study’s methods, results, and findings that is conducted by 
others in the relevant field who have the requisite training and expertise, 
who have no pecuniary or other disqualifying bias with respect to the 
topic, and who are independent of the persons who performed the study.18 
of science in environmental law, referencing a wealth of literature on the topic and suggesting several 
“cautionary tales” about the promotion of using more “good science,” see Oliver Houck, Tales from a 
Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 SCI. 1926, 1926 (2003). Professor 
Wendy Wagner has produced the most extensive body of work examining the claim for using more 
and better science in environmental law. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and 
Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999); Wendy E. Wagner, The ‘Bad Science’ 
Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental 
Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 63 [hereinafter Wagner, Bad Science]; 
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995) 
[hereinafter Wagner, Science Charade]. 
 14. See JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975). For a more recent discussion, see David Markell, “Slack” in the 
Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 
1 (2005). 
 15. For a more complete description of administrative law protections against agency misuse of 
science, see infra notes 75–83 and accompanying text. 
 16. For discussions of how demanding that agencies employ the scientific method would affect 
agency decisions, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in 
Natural Resources Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 17–20 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, The 
Battle over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 584–91 (2004). 
 17. See MOONEY, supra note 13, at 116–19. A counter-movement also has emerged. For 
example, a group of legal scholars openly skeptical of the movement’s motives has formed to, among 
other things, monitor and challenge initiatives of the “sound science” movement such as proposals for 
requiring agencies to subject their proposed decisions to regulatory peer review. See Center for 
Progressive Reform Issues; Clean Science, http://www.progressiveregulation.org/issue_science.cfm 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006).  
 18. THE DEP’T OF ENERGY’S OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. ET AL., PEER REVIEW IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 2 (1998). A peer is “a person having technical expertise in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Peer review is commonplace, indeed, fundamental, to the practice of 
science. It is the gold standard for determining publication and general 
acceptance of scientific research.  
Just as scientific peer review involves independent evaluation of 
scientific research, regulatory peer review refers to the outside evaluation 
of an administrative agency’s compilation, selection, or use of scientific 
data to support a proposed regulatory decision such as a rule, standard, 
permit, or other policy. Like scientific peer review, the review and critique 
would be conducted prior to the agency’s final decision by qualified, 
independent experts who have no pecuniary or other conflict of interest in 
the outcome of the agency’s decision. If peer review works for science, 
goes the argument, it should work for agency decisions that purport to rely 
on science as well.  
This seemingly straightforward logic has not, however, met with easy 
acceptance. The growing debate over agency use of sound science, and of 
regulatory peer review in particular, has become increasingly polarized, 
with strong claims made on both sides. To Congressman Greg Walden (R-
Or.), for example, the case for peer review is obvious.  
If you went to a doctor and he said to you, “we are going to have to 
take off your right leg,” you’d probably want a second opinion. 
Right now under the Endangered Species Act plants, animals, and 
people don’t have the chance to seek a second opinion; you just get 
cut off at the knees.19 
By contrast, the nongovernmental organization Public Citizen contends 
that mandating the uniform use of peer review by federal agencies would: 
favor regulated industry and introduce potentially massive costs and 
delay, thus injecting paralysis by analysis into the regulatory 
process. . . . It is no overstatement that strict application of 
[regulatory peer review] would bring many ordinary functions to a 
grinding halt, including the government’s obligation to present 
the subject matter to be reviewed (or a subset of the subject matter to be reviewed) to a degree at least 
equivalent to that needed for the original work.” Id. at 28. “The peer’s independence from the work 
being reviewed means that the peer, a) was not involved as a participant, supervisor, technical 
reviewer, or advisor in the work being reviewed, and b) to the extent practical, has sufficient freedom 
from funding considerations to assure the work is impartially reviewed.” Id.  
 19. Greg Walden, Statement Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Minerals of the H. Comm. on 
Resources on H.R. 1662, 3 (Feb. 4, 2004), http://walden.house.gov/issues/esa/108thcongress/ESA 
statement.pdf (Rep. Walden (R-OR) was the Sponsor of H.R. 1662).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/1
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public health, environmental and other information on a timely 
basis.20
The increasing temperature of this debate reflects action heating up in 
Washington as well. A series of bills requiring regulatory peer review has 
been proposed in Congress,21 and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) has finalized peer review requirements for the “information 
products” regulatory agencies use in classes of regulatory decisions likely 
to have significant economic or other impacts.22 That regulatory peer 
review has moved so quickly from the newspapers to the Federal Register 
signals the potentially significant ramifications it could have. Regulatory 
peer review is being added to the administrative law toolbox, and it is 
important to understand what this means for agency practice in the future. 
To make sense of the competing claims over regulatory peer review, 
three fundamental questions need to be answered: The first is how many 
Klamaths are there? Regulatory peer review can be justified only if many 
agency policy decisions that should be based at least in part on science 
actually have no or insufficient scientific basis. Increased use of peer 
review will undeniably impose costs on agencies, and unless there is first a 
firm sense of how often agencies reach decisions without sufficient 
scientific support, we may end up overreacting—using a sledgehammer to 
crack an acorn. Second, even if the Klamath experience is widespread—
even if agencies frequently fail to adequately justify policy decisions on 
scientific grounds—are these actually poor policy decisions? The Klamath 
Committee, it is worth noting, never condemned the federal government’s 
decision to close the floodgates, acknowledging that the decision may or 
may not have been justified on policy grounds.23 It just was not justified 
on scientific grounds alone.24 If the policy decision is on target, does it 
really matter that it was not justified by the available data, or does the lack 
of a firm scientific basis inherently call into question the risk of policy 
 20. Letter from Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen to D. Margo Schwab, Office of Info. & 
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 1–2 (Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.progressive 
regulation.org/articles/peer/Public_Citizen_PR_Comments.pdf. 
 21. See, e.g., Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2003, H.R. 1662, 108th 
Cong. (2003). The ESA bills are discussed in more detail infra at notes 120–31 and accompanying 
text.  
 22. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14, 2005). 
OMB’s policy unfolded through several iterations. See Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer 
Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,230 (Apr. 28, 2004); Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information 
Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023 (Sept. 15, 2003). The history and details of OMB’s policy are discussed 
infra at notes 103–11 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 24. See KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 34–35.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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failure? Finally, even if there necessarily is cause for concern when 
agencies explicitly base their policy decisions on inadequate scientific 
foundations, does regulatory peer review provide an effective safeguard? 
Put differently, if instances such as the Klamath do pose a significant risk 
of policy failure, is regulatory peer review the answer? Will it avoid more 
Klamaths in the future?  
Despite the raucous public debate over regulatory peer review, none of 
these questions has been adequately addressed in scholarly literature, 
much less by the folksy wisdom and Chicken Little cries of the various 
interest group combatants. Most legal scholarship on the issue has opposed 
the use of regulatory peer review, but, as useful and insightful as some of 
this work has proven to be, we believe the issue is far from put to rest.25 
Indeed, most of the academic commentary has focused on whether 
agencies produce or rely on flawed scientific evidence or so-called “bad 
science.” Largely overlooked, but pertinent to the question of what role 
peer review could play, is the potential that agencies might misuse 
perfectly credible science, or so-called “good science,” by overstating the 
extent to which it supports their policy and regulatory decisions. No study 
has ever demonstrated whether use of regulatory peer review would have 
detected other instances, like the Klamath, in which the concern is that the 
agency has stretched credible science too far in an effort to justify its 
policy decision, or whether the benefits of detecting those instances would 
have justified the costs of the peer review programs, or whether it would 
have even mattered from the standpoint of reaching sound policy 
decisions.26 This Article addresses these questions directly, grounding the 
 25. For a general discussion of the role of peer review in regulatory law, see Lars Noah, 
Scientific “Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 
EMORY L.J. 1033 (2000). The Klamath saga prompted several scholars to examine the use of peer 
review in the context of endangered species protection. See Burke, supra note 8, at 506–14; Doremus 
& Tarlock, supra note 1, at 324–31; McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 7, at 107–11. Holly Doremus 
and J.B. Ruhl have each more broadly discussed the merits of using peer review in connection with 
administration of the Endangered Species Act. See Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future 
of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004); J.B. Ruhl, 
Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species Act, 83 NEB. L. REV. 398 
(2004). Wendy Wagner has critiqued proposals for regulatory peer review in the broader context of 
environmental law in general. Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 67–84; Wagner, Science 
Charade, supra note 13, at 1699–1701. OMB’s peer review policy, which extends to a wide range of 
regulatory agencies, has also been the subject of scholarly analysis. See Sarah Grimmer, Recent 
Development, Public Controversy over Peer Review, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 275 (2005); Sidney A. 
Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,064 (2004).  
 26. Wendy Wagner has pointed out that the debate over regulatory peer review has focused 
primarily on agencies that establish science-based standards and perform scientific functions directly, 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) setting of toxicity levels or the Food and Drug 
Administration’s review of drug health effects, and thus has largely ignored “the larger universe of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/1
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debate over the use of regulatory peer review in agency decision making 
and charting a productive route forward.  
Part II of the Article describes scientific peer review and its practical 
application in journal publication, grant-award, and agency settings, 
illustrating the distinction between those applications and regulatory peer 
review. The obvious difference between the use of peer review in 
scientific research settings and in agency regulatory settings is that science 
does not purport to involve normative policy decisions, whereas regulation 
explicitly does. This section thus explores how peer review would operate 
in that different context.  
The next two sections of the Article address the current debate over 
regulatory peer review, setting out the arguments in favor of its use in Part 
III and their critiques in Part IV. Ironically, claims pro and con about 
regulatory peer review rely on very few data points—any rigorous peer 
review of their merits would fault them for this. In order to provide an 
empirical basis for our evaluation, therefore, we conducted a nationwide 
survey of environmental lawyers to reveal the perceptions of practitioners 
whose clients are or would be affected by regulatory peer review. As 
reported infra, we found a remarkably intense divergence of opinion 
between private and public sector attorneys over the prevalence of poor 
use of science by regulatory agencies, the need for regulatory peer review 
in response, and its likely effectiveness. Generally, representatives of 
industry, and also, increasingly, of environmental groups, believe agencies 
frequently base policy decisions on inadequate scientific foundations, 
whereas agency representatives defend their performance. The debate 
raging in the White House and Congress, in other words, is not merely 
political rhetoric. It reflects a sharp, deep division of opinion among the 
front line practitioners of administrative law who have the experience to 
evaluate the prospects of regulatory peer review. Put simply, regulatory 
peer review has become a polarizing and deeply felt issue.  
In Part V of the Article we step back from the intensity of the debate to 
reassess the role of peer review in the regulatory process, suggesting a 
different way to think about its potential costs, benefits, and appropriate 
regulatory decisions involving the grant of permits and licenses.” See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 
13, at 72–73. OMB, for example, excludes from its peer review policy for federal agencies any data 
“[d]isseminated in the course of an individual agency adjudication or permit proceeding.” Final 
Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2677. Wagner also observes that “these 
decisions rest in large part on unvalidated industry science,” Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 
73, which, if true, would make the case for applying regulatory peer review to them even stronger. It 
is, therefore, this larger, but largely ignored universe of regulatory decisions that is the focus of this 
Article.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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applications. Contrary to most scholarship on the topic, we argue that the 
unavoidable confluence of science and policy that agencies confront does 
not pose an insurmountable barrier to effective use of regulatory peer 
review. Most of the debate over regulatory peer review centers on whether 
agencies adequately practice science and, if not, whether peer review 
could improve the quality of agency practices. But this reflects just one 
side of the two-sided problem of how to meld science and policy, and we 
agree that it is likely not where peer review would produce much gain. 
Rather, we believe regulatory peer review is most effective when focusing 
on how agencies apply science in support of their regulatory decisions. 
The Klamath experience illustrates the difference: the Klamath Committee 
did not criticize the way in which the agencies compiled data or the merits 
of the final policy decision to close the floodgates; rather, the Klamath 
Committee faulted the agencies for arguing that the data alone were 
sufficient to support the decision without reliance on normative policy 
judgments to fill any gaps.27  
When focused on the latter inquiry—the question of whether the 
agency’s claims of scientific support for its decision are justified—
regulatory peer review can help inform the public about where an agency’s 
use of science in support of a proposed decision ends and where its use of 
professional judgment and normative policy choices begins. The standard 
argument that agencies must make policy decisions in the face of 
incomplete and uncertain scientific data, and thus should not be bound to 
the rigors of peer review, turns the issue on its head. Designed wisely, 
regulatory peer review can help reveal how much scientific uncertainty 
underlies an agency decision and can thus demand that the agency explain 
how the gap was filled. This function, we argue, can lead to greater 
transparency in agency decision processes and greater legitimacy of 
agency decisions in the eyes of the public, legislatures, and the courts.  
Finally, in Part VI of the Article we move the debate forward by 
evaluating different proposals currently under consideration for the design 
of regulatory peer review and propose a way to take advantage of what 
peer review has to offer without imposing undue demands on agency 
resources. Regulatory peer review is a hot topic at the moment, with 
agencies moving to implement OMB’s recently promulgated policy and 
Congress proposing yet more peer review requirements. These proposals, 
however, are either over-inclusive, as are proposals in Congress to subject 
virtually all ESA decisions to regulatory peer review, or under-inclusive, 
 27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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as is OMB’s policy limiting peer review to decisions of extreme economic 
or other impact. The problem in each case is that, while there is good 
reason to believe that regulatory peer review can serve salutary purposes 
in administrative law, the scope of the problem is not competently 
addressed. There is no evidence that all agency decisions suffer from the 
Klamath syndrome, or that only the “big” ones are suspect.  
Ironically, the scope of the problem cannot be assessed meaningfully 
without peer review. Without conducting regulatory peer review one 
cannot reasonably conclude whether agencies ought to be required to 
conduct regulatory peer review, because no one knows how big a problem 
agency misuse of science is. To a scientist, this dilemma has an easy 
solution—the practice of random sampling. At present there is no 
institutional structure in place for systematically reviewing the scientific 
basis of regulatory decisions—i.e., for evaluating whether an agency’s 
claim that science gets it from point A to point B has a legitimate basis. 
Hence, in order to assist policymakers in assessing the problem of 
agencies’ reliance on science in regulatory decisions, if there is one, we 
propose the use of mandatory “randomized peer review” by agencies. A 
small number of decisions in particular categories of agency actions would 
be routinely subjected to peer review in order to determine whether more 
frequent or widespread application of peer review for that class of actions 
or for the agency as a whole is justified. This diagnostic, adaptive 
approach has not been considered to date and, we argue, delivers the 
greatest benefits of regulatory peer review while minimizing the costs.  
II. WHAT IS PEER REVIEW AND WHERE IS IT USED? 
The underlying premise for regulatory peer review boils down to 
“what’s good for science is good for regulation that relies on science.” 
This is an attractive turn of phrase, but it compares apples and oranges. 
Promulgating a regulation for exposure to carcinogens, it goes without 
saying, is not the same thing as finding the cure for cancer. Using science, 
in other words, is not the same thing as doing science. In order to assess 
whether the practice of peer review makes sense in regulatory settings, 
then, we must first understand clearly the use and benefits of peer review 
in science and how transferable these are. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Conventional Applications of Scientific Peer Review28
Peer review is most strongly associated with scientific journal 
publication decisions, in which it has been in use for over 300 years, but it 
is also employed in a wide array of settings, including grant-funding 
decisions and faculty evaluations.29 Within science, peer review is widely 
considered “essential to the integrity of scientific and scholarly 
communication.”30 Indeed, for many scientists, peer review “does not 
merely reflect the scientific method; it is the scientific method.”31
When peer review is used in the context of journal publication and 
grant-award decisions, the journal or granting institution acts as a 
“middleman” to find independent reviewers with relevant expertise who 
will review the science, not the scientists, and evaluate the merits of 
publication. The journal review process has been summarized as follows: 
[a]n aspiring author sends a manuscript to a journal’s editorial 
office. The journal editor, or for large journals one of the associate 
editors, logs in the manuscript, selects two or three reviewers to 
evaluate the manuscript, and sends each a copy. Reviewers are 
asked to assess the manuscript and make a recommendation to 
accept, accept with revisions, or reject the manuscript. The editor or 
associate editors then decide if they will accept the recommendation 
of the reviewers.32
Grant-funding peer review follows a similar process.33 In both cases, 
the procedures seek to ensure “a documented, critical review performed by 
 28. This discussion of the use and perception of peer review in science also appears in 
substantially the same form in Ruhl, supra note 25, at 407–09. 
 29. See ANN C. WELLER, EDITORIAL PEER REVIEW: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 1–7 
(2001). 
 30. Id. at 322. 
 31. Noah, supra note 25, at 1045. 
 32. WELLER, supra note 29, at 1; see also FYTTON ROWLAND, THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS: A 
REPORT TO THE JISC SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATIONS GROUP 1 (2002), http://www.jisc.ac.uk/ 
uploaded_documents/rowland.pdf (JISC is the Joint Information Systems Committee, the UK’s higher 
education support agency). Rowland states: 
[w]hen a submitted report first arrives at the editorial office of a journal, it is first vetted by 
the editor, who may reject it out of hand—either because it is "out of scope" (not dealing with 
the right subject matter for that journal) or because it is manifestly of such low quality that it 
cannot be considered at all. Papers that pass this first hurdle are then sent to experts in the 
field of the paper—usually two—who are generally asked to classify the paper as publishable 
immediately, publishable with amendments and improvements, or not publishable. 
Id. 
 33. For example, the National Science Foundation advises persons submitting grant proposals as 
follows: 
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peers . . . who are independent of the work being reviewed.”34 The quality 
of the reviewers is central to any peer review. Ideally, one selects 
reviewers who have demonstrated relevant expertise, independence, and 
freedom from conflicts of interest.35  
Substantively, the peer review process is not a “de novo” review, to 
borrow from a legal model, but rather more like appellate review. The 
journal Ecology, for example, advises its reviewers that their comments 
should address ten factors: (1) importance and interest to this journal's 
readers; (2) scientific soundness; (3) originality; (4) degree to which 
conclusions are supported; (5) organization and clarity; (6) cohesiveness 
of argument; (7) length relative to information content; (8) whether 
material should be moved to the digital appendices; (9) conciseness and 
writing style; and (10) appropriateness for the targeted journal and specific 
section of the journal.36 Yet even when a peer reviewer employs all of 
these criteria, the intensity of journal and grant peer review is nothing like 
de novo review. There is no independent research to verify whether the 
data are accurate. Ecology explains, for example, that in assessing 
“scientific soundness” the reviewer should examine the methods, data 
presentation, and statistical design and analyses of the paper, but the 
instructions do not include engaging in independent data authentication.37 
[p]roposals received by the NSF Proposal Processing Unit are assigned to the appropriate 
NSF program for acknowledgement and, if they meet NSF requirements, for review. All 
proposals are carefully reviewed by a scientist, engineer, or educator serving as an NSF 
Program Officer, and usually by three to ten other persons outside NSF who are experts in the 
particular fields represented by the proposal. Proposers are invited to suggest names of 
persons they believe are especially well qualified to review the proposal and/or persons they 
would prefer not review the proposal. These suggestions may serve as one source in the 
reviewer selection process at the Program Officer's discretion. Program Officers may obtain 
comments from assembled review panels or from site visits before recommending final action 
on proposals. Senior NSF staff further review recommendations for awards. 
NAT’L SCIENCE FOUNDATION, GRANT PROPOSAL GUIDE 35 (2003), available at http://www.nsf.gov/ 
pubs/2003/nsf03041/nsf03_04.pdf. Variations exist with respect to whether the journal or grant 
institution uses reviewers from a standing board or selects reviewers from a list compiled by 
recommendations. See WELLER, supra note 29, at 2. 
 34. THE DEP’T OF ENERGY’S OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH ET AL., supra note 18, at 2; see supra note 
18 and accompanying text. 
 35. WELLER, supra note 29, at 207. Of course, even reviewers who meet these criteria may have 
personal biases about approaches to or disputes in the particular scientific discipline, and there is no 
objective way of de-biasing review panels from this effect. See Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the 
Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 277 (1998).  
 36. Ecological Soc’y of Am. Publ’ns Office, Guidelines for Reviewers (Dec. 9, 2005), 
http://www.esapubs.org/esapubs/reviewers.htm. These criteria are representative of the scientific 
journal industry in general. See WELLER, supra note 29, at 160–66. 
 37. Ecological Soc’y of Am. Publ’ns Office, supra note 36. As Holly Doremus has explained, 
“[p]eer reviewers are not expected to authenticate the data presented to them. Rather, their role is to 
evaluate the methods employed and the facial plausibility of the conclusions drawn.” Holly Doremus, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Indeed, peer review would grind itself and journal publication to a 
screeching halt were it to require peer reviewers to engage in independent 
testing and data analysis.  
While not nearly as probing as a de novo analysis, it is widely believed 
that this “appellate style” peer review provides tremendous benefits.38 
First, peer review serves as a filter, ensuring quality control. Knowing 
their articles will be evaluated by peers, submitting authors have a strong 
incentive to ensure their conclusions are supported by the data. Second, 
peer review prioritizes, allowing editors and grant makers to rank articles 
and proposals. In the face of more articles or grant proposals submitted 
than can be published or funded, peer review provides an effective means 
of winnowing the competition.  
While less widespread than in scientific publications or grant making, 
peer review is also employed by a number of federal agencies that have 
primarily science-based missions. A 1999 study by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), for example, found widespread peer review 
employed by science agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the National Institutes of Health.39 Peer review was 
used for many purposes, ranging from grant awards and pre-publication 
review of research to budget review and program and employee 
evaluation.40 These procedures were ad hoc, with no uniform definitions 
or procedures, and ranged from outside mail reviewers and workshops to 
internal and external standing panels.41 Similar studies have documented 
how agencies use (or do not use) peer review to fulfill science-based 
missions.42  
Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1147 (1997). 
 38. There is some empirical evidence in support of this belief. See WELLER, supra note 29, at 51, 
53. 
 39. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-99, FEDERAL RESEARCH: PEER REVIEW 
PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY 1–10 (1999). 
 40. Some specific examples of agency uses of peer review include NOAA competitive research 
proposals, Agricultural Research Service project plans, and National Institutes of Health reviews of 
intramural research. Id. at 18, 39, 53. 
 41. Id. at 4–7. 
 42. See PANEL ON PEER REVIEW, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR WATER 
RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING 19–31, app. D (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
openbook/030908508X/html (describing procedures used by the Army Corps of Engineers, EPA, the 
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Transportation); Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env. 
of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, Independent Peer Review of Products that Support 
Agency Decision-Making, http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/03-05-03/03-05-03memo. html 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (describing peer review practices of EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, 
and the Army Corps of Engineers).  
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B. Extending Peer Review to Regulation 
The use of peer review is far more limited and variable by agencies 
when exercising regulatory responsibilities. There is a strong tradition of 
expert advisory panels advising agencies on specific policy topics, ranging 
from the Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Advisory Boards to 
the Food and Drug Administration’s Technical Advisory Committees.43 
Peer review is used much less frequently for discrete regulatory decisions 
such as standard setting, and almost never in permitting and licensing.44 
One reason for this, presumably, is that discrete regulatory decisions are 
where policy meets the real world, and thus peer review would involve an 
assessment of how an agency used available scientific data in reaching a 
particular application of policy, rather than a scientific decision about 
whether a research hypothesis is confirmed by data.  
Using peer review in a regulatory context would thus require adapting 
conventional scientific peer review in three respects. First, it will often be 
the case that the agency is not actually doing the science that produces the 
data upon which it relies for its decision, but rather uses data already 
available through other scientific research efforts. Thus, regulatory peer 
review will need to address how the agency incorporated pre-existing 
scientific knowledge into its own decision processes. Second, it will not 
always be the case that the data upon which the agency relies are the result 
of peer-reviewed studies.45 Regulatory peer review, therefore, will need to 
provide some assessment of those studies in the form of an evaluation of 
the agency’s choices over which data to use. Finally, many regulatory 
decisions are not simply extensions of the scientific method—i.e., they 
involve using science to inform, but not control, the exercise of the 
agency’s professional policy judgment. Regulatory peer review thus would 
have to be mindful that, in getting from point A to point B, an agency may 
have the discretion or the mandate to rely on an integration of science and 
other policy factors, whereas the peer review must be limited to the 
science alone. 
To make these distinctions more concrete, it is helpful to revisit the 
context of the Klamath and the ESA. The ESA is a science-based statute 
 43. For information on EPA’s Science Advisory Board, see Envtl. Prot. Agency, About the EPA 
Science Advisory Board, http://www.epa.gov/sab/about.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). For 
information on the FDA’s Advisory Committees, see Carol Rados, Advisory Committees: Critical to 
the FDA’s Product Review Process, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 17.  
 44. See supra note 26. 
 45. Indeed, as Wendy Wagner points out, case-specific regulatory decisions usually rely, at least 
in part, on “unvalidated industry science.” Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 73. 
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dedicated to conserving and restoring populations of endangered species;46 
as a result, it provides numerous opportunities for agency officials to rely 
on scientific data in a policy setting.47 Section 4 of the Act, for example, 
authorizes the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to identify “endangered” and 
“threatened” species, known as the listing function,48 and then to designate 
“critical habitat,”49 and to develop “recovery plans” for the species.50 
Section 7 requires all federal agencies to ensure that actions they carry out, 
fund, or authorize do not “jeopardize” the continued existence of listed 
species or “result in the destruction or modification” of their critical 
habitat.51 Section 9 requires that all persons, including all private and 
public entities subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid committing takings of 
listed species of fish and wildlife.52 Sections 7 (for federal actions) and 10 
 46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
 47. We each have had the pleasure of being asked to make presentations and write commentary 
for publication about the ESA more than several times. Out of necessity, the materials in this 
“background” section of this Article are a variation, tailored for the instant purposes, of a template one 
of us has developed and used to inform readers not familiar with the ESA of the statute’s basic 
structure. Similar treatments, in other words, appear elsewhere. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 25, at 412–
17. Like the other work, this Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA. 
Rather, it uses the ESA in this section as a case study for understanding how peer review would 
operate in regulatory contexts. For comprehensive treatments of the ESA, several of which are referred 
to frequently infra, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed., 1997); ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 
(Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES]; 
LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN AND RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES DESKBOOK (2003); 
STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); TONY A. SULLINS, ESA: 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001). 
 48. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the listing process, see LIEBESMAN & 
PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 15–20; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 47, at 38–58; 
SULLINS, supra note 47, at 11–25; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species Protection 
Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 19. 
 49. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000). For a description of the critical habitat designation process, 
see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 20–24; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 47, 
at 59–69; SULLINS, supra note 47, at 26–28; Federico Cheever, Endangered Species Act: Critical 
Habitat, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 47; Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. 
Brennan, The Growing Importance of Critical Habitat for Species Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 88 (2001). See also infra Part V.B.  
 50. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000). For a description of the recovery plan process, see LIEBESMAN & 
PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 24–26; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 47, at 71–77; 
SULLINS, supra note 47, at 34–37; John M. Volkman, Recovery Planning, in LAW, POLICY, AND 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 71. 
 51. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). For a description of the consultation process, see LIEBESMAN 
& PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 27–39; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 47, at 83–103; 
SULLINS, supra note 47, § 5; Marilyn Averill, Protecting Species Through Interagency Cooperation, in 
LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 87. 
 52. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the cases developing the legal standards 
for what constitutes “take,” see LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 39–45; STANFORD ENVTL. 
LAW SOC’Y, supra note 47, at 104–12; SULLINS, supra note 47, at 44–54; Alan M. Glen & Craig M. 
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(for actions not subject to section 7) establish a procedure and criteria for 
FWS and NOAA to approve “incidental” takings of listed species.53  
Each of these provisions involves an intersection between policy 
decisions and scientific determinations. In the standard-setting role of 
listing species, for example, FWS and NOAA must decide whether a 
species is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of 
its range (endangered) or whether it is likely to become so in the 
foreseeable future (threatened).54 This requires a series of scientific 
determinations about the taxonomy of the species—if indeed it is a 
species55—its range, the present and threatened injuries to its habitat, 
whether it is being over-utilized for commercial purposes or threatened by 
disease or predation, whether these threats are enough to cause it to go 
extinct, and, if so, when.56 A similar law-science confluence appears in 
policy application settings such as enforcement of the jeopardy prohibition 
found in section 7,57 which was the driving legal standard in the Klamath 
River conflict.58 The statute requires FWS and NOAA to assess whether 
the direct and indirect effects of a proposed federal agency action will 
Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 
65 (2001); Gina Guy, Take Prohibitions and Section 9, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 47, at 191; Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities “Take” 
Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, AND 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 47, at 207.  
 53. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1539(a)(1) (2000). An incidental taking, although not the subject of 
a specific statutory definition provision, is described in section 10 as a taking that is “incidental to, and 
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” § 1539(a)(1)(B). The FWS and 
NOAA have adopted this meaning for purposes of the regulations implementing section 7. 50 C.F.R. 
§ 402.02 (2005). For a description of the incidental take authorization procedures, see LIEBESMAN & 
PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 46–50; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 47, at 127–73; 
SULLINS, supra note 47, at 87–102. 
 54. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20) (2000). 
 55. For a comprehensive comparison of the biological and legal conceptions of “species,” see 
Blake Hood, Transgenic Salmon and the Definition of “Species” Under the Endangered Species Act, 
18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 78–98 (2002). Hood notes, “[t]he scientific consensus on ‘species’ . . 
. is that no complete consensus exists and that different definitions suit different purposes.” Id. at 78. 
The default position in science as to what constitutes a species relies on Ernst Mayr’s “biological 
species concept,” which focuses on reproductive isolation. Id. at 81–82. Still, actually defining the 
boundaries of a species and deciding whether a particular organism belongs to one or another involves 
complex observational, morphological, and genetic considerations. See id. at 82–83. For additional 
discussion of the debate surrounding how to define a species, both legally and scientifically, see 
LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 11–15; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC’Y, supra note 47, at 
31–38; SULLINS, supra note 47, at 6–11; Doremus, supra note 37, at 1087–112. Several cases turn on 
whether FWS or NOAA has correctly defined what constitutes a species within the meaning of the 
statute. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 47, at 11–15 (providing comprehensive discussion 
about definition of species). 
 56. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000). 
 57. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring agencies to ensure no agency action jeopardizes a listed species). 
 58. See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 319–20.  
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jeopardize the continued existence of the species59 by appreciably 
reducing its chances of recovery and survival in the wild.60 To reach a 
decision on that question, FWS and NOAA must determine as a scientific 
matter the nature and magnitude of the impact the action will have on 
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of the species, and how much any 
such impacts will reduce the chances of the species surviving and 
recovering in the wild.61  
Clearly, regulatory agencies such as FWS and NOAA cannot easily 
avoid the science component of their mandates in regulatory applications. 
Indeed, to manage these and other necessary scientific judgments under 
the ESA, the statute mandates that agencies apply a “best scientific data 
available” standard. For example, when deciding whether to list a species, 
FWS and NOAA must consider factors such as loss of habitat using only 
“the best scientific and commercial data available.”62 Similarly, the 
biological component of the decision whether to designate critical habitat 
must use the “best scientific data available.”63 And the “no jeopardy” and 
“no adverse modification” directives to federal agencies, which rely on a 
case-specific consultation procedure between the action agency and ESA 
agency with jurisdiction over the species in question,64 adopt the same 
standard.65  
While these provisions clearly infuse a science-based mandate into the 
agencies’ regulatory functions, they just as clearly provide that the 
agencies will use science rather than do science.66 As described earlier, 
peer review is normally associated more with the latter—with the actual 
practice of science and presentation and defense of scientific 
conclusions.67 Regulatory agencies generally do not engage in original 
scientific research to make regulatory decisions.68 Perhaps they have 
decided that so long as they rely on peer-reviewed science, subjecting their 
decisions to a second layer of peer review would be redundant.  
Indeed, few regulatory agencies ever subject their regulatory decisions 
to peer review, and those that do usually limit the practice to standard-
 59. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2). 
 60. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005) (defining jeopardy). 
 61. See id. 
 62. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
 63. § 1533(b)(2). 
 64. § 1536(a)(2), (b)–(c). 
 65. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (2005). 
 66. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. 98-934, 2002 WL 1733618, at *9 
(D.D.C. July 29, 2002). 
 67. See supra Part II.A. 
 68. See infra Part III.A. 
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setting decisions.69 For example, under a policy FWS and NOAA adopted 
in 1994 with respect to species-listing decisions, the agencies promise to 
“incorporate independent peer review in listing and recovery activities.”70 
Notably, the policy does not apply to any of the agencies’ action-specific 
permitting authorities, such as jeopardy consultations under section 7 or 
incidental take-permitting under sections 7 and 10 of the statute.71 This 
goes farther than most regulatory agencies have been willing to consider, 
yet does not reach what Congress and the White House would require.72
III. THE CASE FOR PEER REVIEW 
Despite the controversy over mandating regulatory peer review, both 
sides agree on the overall goal—regulatory agencies that make decisions 
based in whole or in part on scientific research should seek to ensure their 
decisions accurately interpret and employ the research results. Improving 
agency decision making is hardly a new concern, of course. Indeed, many 
methodologies to ensure sound agency decisions are already firmly 
embedded in the basic standards of administrative law prescribed under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).73 These rules require the courts 
to apply considerable deference to the agency’s decision. A reviewing 
court may not substitute its judgment for the agency but must undertake a 
“thorough, probing, in-depth review” of the agency’s decision.74 Thus, a 
court will reject an agency’s decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”75 An agency 
decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency either has relied on 
factors which  
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
 69. See Noah, supra note 25, at 1034–37, 1050–57. 
 70. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy 
for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270, 34,270 (July 1, 1994). 
This process, they explain, will involve “[s]olicit[ing] the expert opinions of three appropriate and 
independent specialists regarding pertinent scientific or commercial data and assumptions relating to 
the taxonomy, population models, and supportive biological and ecological information for species 
under consideration for listing.” Id. We assess the results of this ESA peer review in Part IV.B, infra.  
 71. See id. For example, neither FWS nor NOAA instituted peer review for their respective 
decisions in the Klamath controversy. 
 72. See infra Part III.C. 
 73. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2000). 
 74. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). 
 75. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
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implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or 
the product of agency expertise,76
or if it has failed to “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.’”77  
A scientist would be accused of practicing unsound science in research 
if he or she declared that relevant data were ignored or altered in reaching 
the research conclusion simply because the data did not support the 
conclusion.78 Likewise, under the foregoing rules of judicial review an 
agency would be chastised for doing the same in reaching rulemaking or 
adjudication decisions. Such misuse of scientific data would be arbitrary 
and capricious, and any court reviewing the decision would know to strike 
it down as a violation of the APA.79 A court would not need to employ 
new principles or methodologies to justify such a ruling.  
This is a powerful rebuttal to the general advocacy of “sound science” 
for agency decision making, but it does not adequately respond to 
arguments for using regulatory peer review to identify cases in which, as 
in the Klamath, an agency uses properly assembled scientific data but 
reaches a policy decision not supported by the data. Recall that the 
available fisheries data did not provide a clear basis for concluding that 
reduced water levels would jeopardize the endangered fish populations.80 
The policy decision to halt irrigation flows was not a misuse of science, 
but it certainly was not dictated by the science either. Such a decision 
could result from an agency’s innocent misunderstanding of the science or 
from its lack of expertise. Or, of course, it could result from an agency’s 
deliberate attempt to stretch the available science in support of its policy 
decision farther than is justified. Whether innocent or deliberate, this kind 
of misuse of science does not necessarily lead to poor policy decisions. 
After all, agencies may have no choice but to extrapolate from incomplete 
data when a decision needs to be made at that moment. It can raise 
 76. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 77. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 78. See, e.g., Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Retraction, 311 SCI. 335 (2006) (editor of Science 
retracts article journal published on stem cell research because of fabricated data); Gretchen Vogel et 
al., Ecologists Roiled by Misconduct Case, 303 SCI. 606 (Jan. 30, 2004) (reporting developments 
concerning allegations that a world-renowned ecologist fabricated data in a published study of genetic 
fitness traits).  
 79. See, e.g., N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 482–83 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (holding 
the decision not to list the owl was arbitrary and capricious in light of the biologists’ findings). 
 80. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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concerns, however, if an agency justifies its decision to the public, courts, 
and legislature as being driven chiefly by the science when it is in fact 
based on a policy judgment informed by inconclusive science. 
Whether an agency’s overreliance on data is intentional or not, the 
APA’s procedural safeguards are unlikely to be an effective safeguard 
when no overt suppression or manipulation of data is involved. Interested 
parties may argue that the agency has oversold its science, but, as 
interested parties, they may be equally guilty of that offense. Faced with 
competing versions of what the available science means, a court is in no 
position to conduct a reliable peer review and would thus lean decidedly 
toward deferring to the agency’s version, as it must under the APA. 
Regulatory peer review therefore may have something to offer in such 
cases, which, given the scientific uncertainty present in many regulatory 
decisions, may be quite common. 
Peer review, however, is neither mandated by most environmental laws 
nor required through the default administrative law doctrines of the APA. 
Procedures with some of the attributes of regulatory peer review are 
already present in conventional administrative law processes, but these fall 
short of peer review’s promise. Public participation in regulatory 
rulemaking decisions through notice and comment and in adjudicatory 
proceedings through representation, for example, provide forms of outside 
review.81 But they are neither limited to experts nor do they screen out 
biased members of the public.82 Indeed, quite the opposite is likely—one 
can reasonably expect that only members of the public with a personal 
stake in the matter will be prone to get involved. After all, if one does not 
have a vested interest in the regulation, why bother to get involved? 
Judicial review of agency decisions ensures a close review by an 
ostensibly unbiased party, but it cannot approach the same level of 
expertise provided by peer review. Moreover, judges must adhere to the 
review standards of the APA, not those of scientific peer review.83 Peer 
review, in other words, is the one clear demand of the “sound science” 
movement that administrative law does not already require.  
Still, that regulatory peer review is not already required hardly compels 
the case for requiring it. So why do it? What benefits does peer review 
offer regulation that other procedural safeguards do not? The promised 
 81. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 553–54 (2000). 
 82. See Noah, supra note 25, at 1074–76. OMB makes the point, in its final peer review policy, 
that “[p]eer review should not be confused with public comment and other stakeholder processes.” 
Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2665 (Jan. 14, 2005). 
 83. See 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); Noah, supra note 25, at 1076–77. 
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benefits of integrating peer review into the regulatory decision making 
process are both substantive and procedural. Advocates argue that 
providing independent expert feedback will generally improve the quality 
of regulatory decisions.84 Like Representative Walden’s folksy reference 
to a doctor’s second opinion,85 in its initial proposal for mandatory peer 
review OMB asserted that “peer review can provide a vital second opinion 
on the science that underlies federal regulation.”86 Proponents also argue 
that the use of independent, outside experts in regulatory peer review 
should enhance the legitimacy of the regulatory process by reducing the 
appearance of agency bias and conflict of interest.87
Other than pointing to the Klamath experience, however, what 
theoretical or empirical support do advocates of regulatory peer review 
advance for the claim that what is good for science is good for regulation? 
This section lays out the central chain of reasoning behind leading 
regulatory peer review proposals. There are, in fact, good reasons to 
believe that agencies face institutional biases and pressures that could 
systematically lead employees to overstate how much the available science 
supports a particular policy decision. In addition, our survey revealed that 
practitioners of environmental law working primarily in the private sector 
harbor a deep distrust of agencies in this regard, a distrust based, we 
presume, not primarily on political theory but on personal perspective and 
practical experience. The push for regulatory peer review in Congress and 
the White House has clearly been in response to these perceived defects in 
agency process.  
A. Institutional Theory 
A key assumption underlying regulatory peer review proposals is that 
there is a problem that needs to be fixed—agencies often, perhaps 
systematically, present scientific data as supporting a policy decision more 
than is justified. To be sure, some advocates of peer review support this 
assertion with no more than a basic distrust of government and regulation. 
But political science theory suggests why, quite apart from anti-regulatory 
agendas, one might be concerned over agency use of science.  
 84. See Lars Noah, Peer Review and Regulatory Reform, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
10,606, 10,608 (2000). 
 85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 86. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,024 
(Sept. 15, 2003). 
 87. Id. 
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There is an immense literature on the institutional challenges inherent 
in agency operation, and many of these theories explain why agencies 
might selectively use scientific data in a biased or incomplete manner.88 
The theory of agency mission focus, for example, asserts that single-
mission agencies tend zealously to further their statutory missions in a 
single-minded fashion.89 This is a variant on the theories of agency 
capture and public choice, in which the agency comes to view furthering 
the interests of the regulated community as more important to its mission 
than protecting the more amorphous public interest.90  
Personal bias can also play a role. Most biologists who work for the 
FWS or NOAA, one could reasonably imagine, care personally about 
conserving wildlife—that is why they became wildlife biologists and have 
devoted their careers to working in an agency dedicated to wildlife 
conservation. If the neutrality of agency biologists is not to be trusted, this 
argument suggests—and this is clearly an underlying premise of the 
“sound science” movement—it is because they are agency biologists with 
“shared biases,” not because they are simply biologists.91  
Finally, and perhaps most important, agencies work in an environment 
of serious resource and time constraints. The conclusion of the Klamath 
Committee, for example, was not that the agency decisionmakers 
dissembled or acted in bad faith. One need not adopt a cynical view of 
agency behavior to understand why the exigencies of making complicated 
decisions in a short period based on uncertain or conflicting data can 
sometimes lead to decisions with inadequate scientific support.92 
Sympathy for agencies may be due on this score; nevertheless, time and 
resource constraints do appear to be yet one more reason to believe that 
agencies may reach decisions that lack a firm scientific basis.  
Arguing against the use of peer review in regulatory agencies, 
therefore, invites accusations of trying to obscure the flaws of agency 
practice. Advocates of peer review contend that it is the light that will 
expose those flaws, leading to the improved quality of agency decisions 
 88. Wendy Wagner provides a comprehensive study of these institutional forces in the context of 
science and policy. See Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 13, at 1650–73. See generally RICHARD 
J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 1.7–1.10 (3d ed. 1999). 
 89. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 88, § 1.9. 
 90. Id. § 1.7.2. 
 91. Id. § 1.9. 
 92. The Klamath Committee recognized that “agencies may recommend practices for which the 
committee would find virtually no direct scientific support. The committee acknowledges the necessity 
of this practice in many situations where information is inadequate for development of scientifically 
rigorous decisions.” KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 35.  
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and revealing the biases of agency decisionmakers. On the surface, 
therefore, peer review may have something to offer administrative law in 
general.  
At the same time, regulatory peer review clearly imposes costs on 
agencies that are already operating under tight resource constraints. One 
can believe that agencies might portray science as doing more for their 
policy decisions than is justified and that peer review will improve agency 
decisions in this respect. But that alone does not provide compelling 
justification for greater use of regulatory peer review, because it is just not 
clear how many Klamaths are out there. Whether intentionally or as a 
result of a good-faith mistakes, how frequently would agency regulatory 
decisions purported to be based on science fail the test of peer review? 
Without a sense of how big a problem this poses, advocates of regulatory 
peer review cannot state with any confidence that its theoretical benefits 
outweigh the actual costs of implementation. 
B. Empirical Analysis: Faith, Perceptions, and Demand 
We know of no comprehensive empirical study comparing regulatory 
decisions with and without peer review, attempting to reevaluate past 
regulatory decisions using peer review methods, or estimating the costs of 
broad-based regulatory peer review. Beyond political theory, in other 
words, the case for regulatory peer review is based largely on faith—faith 
in the gospel that agencies do in fact overstate how far their science carries 
them.  
Faith, however, is a powerful force when shared by a multitude. If 
enough of the public believes agencies make poor use of science, that this 
leads to policy failures, and that regulatory peer review is an effective 
check on the problem, arguments for imposing regulatory peer review will 
have traction. Even more compelling, if enough of those who share these 
beliefs are experienced in administrative law and policy—can claim to 
have practical experience with agency regulatory practices—then the 
public is less likely to demand an empirical study of the issue before 
supporting proposals to put regulatory peer review in place. Indeed, this is 
precisely what our survey showed to be the case.  
The survey was designed to elicit respondents’ perceptions about the 
performance of regulatory agencies, the merits of regulatory peer review, 
and the design of regulatory peer review.93 With respect to agency 
 93. The complete survey is available on request from the authors. We provided respondents the 
following definition of regulatory peer review: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/1
p1 Ruhl Salzman book pages.doc 9/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] IN DEFENSE OF REGULATORY PEER REVIEW 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
performance, the survey posed a general question and many detailed ones 
relating to different attributes of agency use of science. Responses 
indicated a significant background level of concern over agency use of 
science among experienced practitioners.94 Indeed, in more detailed 
questions, respondents revealed a deep mistrust of agency behavior. Figure 
1 shows the percentage of responses to specific aspects of agency use of 
science.  
Figure 1. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they 
agree or disagree that the following statements describe agency 
resources and practices. Figures show percent of respondents in 
each category. 
Regulatory Peer Review is the outside evaluation of an administrative agency’s search, 
selection, or use of scientific data used to support a proposed regulatory decision (rule, 
permit, or other policy). The evaluation is conducted prior to the agency’s final decision by 
one or more experts in the relevant field who are independent of the agency and have no 
pecuniary or other conflict of interest with respect to the outcome of the agency’s decision. 
We sent the survey to 900 randomly selected members of the American Bar Association’s Section of 
the Environment, Energy, and Resources (SEER), of whom 158 responded with usable surveys. We 
chose SEER because the leading edge of the regulatory peer review debate has focused on 
environmental law and SEER is a prominent forum for practitioners of environmental law in private 
practice, government, academic, and other practice settings. The survey was voluntary and responses 
were anonymous. We greatly appreciate SEER’s cooperation in providing the member names and their 
contact information (SEER did not commission, direct, or in any other way influence the design or 
implementation of the survey). All funding for the survey and the data analysis was provided by The 
Florida State University (FSU) College of Law. We thank FSU Department of Statistics Professor Kai-
Sheng Song and graduate student Han Yu for their assistance in compiling and analyzing the survey 
data. 
 94. The general question asked respondents to state their level of agreement or disagreement with 
the statement that “based on my experience, administrative agencies usually employ adequate 
procedures for the search, selection, and use of scientific data in regulatory decision making.” 
Although 41% of respondents stated some level of agreement with the statement, 51% somewhat or 
strongly disagreed. 
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 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
No 
Opinion
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree
a. Agencies generally have sufficient time to 
conduct adequate searches for and analyses of 
scientific data relevant to their decisions. 
8 40 4 37 11 
b. Agencies generally have sufficient budgets 
to conduct adequate searches for and analyses 
of scientific data relevant to their decisions. 
3 23 7 36 31 
c. Agencies generally have sufficient expertise 
to conduct adequate searches for and analyses 
of scientific data relevant to their decisions. 
8 33 6 40 13 
d. Agencies generally place an adequate 
priority on searching for scientific data 
relevant to their decisions.  
9 31 12 34 14 
e. Agencies usually select data that have 
adequate scientific reliability.  7 42 8 35 8 
f. Agencies generally place appropriate 
reliance on scientific data that support their 
preferred decisions.  
11 36 12 36 5 
g. Agencies generally give appropriate 
recognition to scientifically reliable data that 
contradict their preferred decisions. 
2 18 9 51 20 
h. Agencies usually employ adequate 
scientific analysis when using the data they 
present as supporting their final decisions. 
6 25 13 48 8 
 
Unsurprisingly, and consistent with the institutional theory reviewed 
above, many respondents indicated they believe that agencies face 
significant time and resource constraints in their use of science (questions 
a through c). More troublesome was the level of concern respondents 
revealed about how agencies prioritize their search for data and about how 
they select and rely on data in support of their decisions: almost half of the 
respondents expressed negative perceptions of agency behavior (questions 
d through f). Most startling, however, were the responses to the final two 
questions in the series (questions g and h). Over 70% of respondents 
disagreed, 20% strongly so, with the statement that agencies generally 
give appropriate recognition to scientifically reliable data that contradict 
their preferred decisions; 56% of respondents disagreed with the statement 
that agencies usually employ adequate scientific analysis when using the 
data they present as supporting their final decisions. The overall picture 
these responses paint is that many experienced practitioners understand 
that agencies face time and resource constraints in their use of science, but 
even more believe agencies make poor use of what science they have at 
their disposal, which leads to the potential overstatement of the scientific 
support for their regulatory decisions. 
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Of course, not all respondents felt this way, and the difference of 
opinion is starkest when the backgrounds of respondents are considered.95 
Not surprisingly, respondents who indicated federal or state agency 
government employment (combined in a regrouping designated as “Govt”) 
as their primary career experience, which made up 15% of the respondent 
pool, were far more likely to hold favorable views of agency use of 
science than were respondents with primarily private law firm or in-house 
careers representing corporations (combined in a regrouping designated 
“Corp”), which accounted for 73% of respondents. For example, 
government respondents were over four times more likely than industry 
respondents to agree with the general statement that agencies usually 
employ adequate procedures.96 Figure 2 shows how extensive this 
difference of opinion was for each of the specific questions about agency 
performance:  
 95. One of the underlying premises of proposals for regulatory peer review is that there is, or at 
least may be, a prevalence of regulatory decisions that are not adequately grounded in scientific 
support. We suspected that private sector attorneys may be more likely than public sector attorneys to 
believe there is such a problem, and thus we grouped the respondent population based on whether the 
respondent had practiced primarily in the private or public sector over the course of his or her career. 
We designed our survey questions to obtain respondents’ perceptions about a variety of topics that any 
experienced environmental lawyer could find controversial and aligned with particular political and 
economic interests. As such, we recognize that responses may be affected by factors such as whether 
the respondent represents industry or government, believes in strong government or libertarian 
principles, and so on. Lawyers that represent industry might have rushed to condemn agencies’ use of 
science in their responses, and lawyers representing government might have taken every opportunity to 
praise them. That is the nature of qualitative perception surveys. As we explain in Parts III and IV of 
the Article, as important as it is to know the actual performance of a regulatory agency in its use of 
science, we believe it is also vital to understand perceptions of the need for and efficacy of regulatory 
peer review, biased as they may be, because of the effect those perceptions will have on the demand 
for regulatory peer review and in dictating acceptance of the agency’s decisions.  
 96. Since the responses called for in our survey are clearly ordinal in nature, we used the logistic 
regression method of statistical analysis for answering various questions of interest throughout our 
study. For example, to determine the influence of government work on perceptions of regulatory peer 
review, we treated the two practice setting categories as the explanatory variable X, and the responses 
to perceptions of regulatory peer review were coded on a scale from 1 to k; for example, 1-5, 
corresponding to strongly agree, somewhat agree, no opinion, somewhat disagree, and strongly 
disagree. The score for each question was treated as the response variable Y and the k possible scores 
of Y are called the response categories. The principal objective of a statistical analysis is to investigate 
the relationship between the explanatory variable X and the response variable Y. The ordinal nature of 
the responses leads naturally to statistical models based on the cumulative response probabilities of 
observing response categories less than or equal to a given score j, when the covariate is X. More 
specifically, we are interested in investigating the influence of the explanatory variable X on the 
cumulative response probability up to and including category j. The logistic regression method of 
examining such relationships involves modeling the logarithm of the odds of the event of observing 
response categories up to and including category j as a function of the explanatory variable X through 
a linear regression equation. 
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Figure 2. The second column shows which group, federal or state 
government career (Govt) or private firm or in-house corporate 
career (Corp), was significantly more likely to agree with the 
statement in the first column (i.e., to answer “strongly agree” or 
“somewhat agree”), based on the breakdown between the two 
groups who agreed (third and fourth columns). To indicate the 
strength of the difference, if any, between the two groups, the fifth 
column shows the odds that a person selected randomly from the 
more likely group would agree with the statement compared to a 
person selected randomly from the less likely group. 
 
 
More Likely 
to Agree 
% agreeing that 
were Govt 
% agreeing that 
were Corp 
Odds 
a. Agencies generally have sufficient time to 
conduct adequate searches for and analyses 
of scientific data relevant to their decisions.  
Neither    
b. Agencies generally have sufficient 
budgets to conduct adequate searches for and 
analyses of scientific data relevant to their 
decisions. 
Govt 70 30 5.7:1 
c. Agencies generally have sufficient 
expertise to conduct adequate searches for 
and analyses of scientific data relevant to 
their decisions. 
Govt 64 36 3.3:1 
d. Agencies generally place an adequate 
priority on searching for scientific data 
relevant to their decisions.  
Govt 63 37 2.9:1 
e. Agencies usually select data that have 
adequate scientific reliability.  Govt 60 40 2.2:1 
f. Agencies generally place appropriate 
reliance on scientific data that support their 
preferred decisions.  
Neither 
    
g. Agencies generally give appropriate 
recognition to scientifically reliable data that 
contradict their preferred decisions. 
Govt 75 25 8.8:1 
h. Agencies usually employ adequate 
scientific analysis when using the data they 
present as supporting their final decisions. 
Govt 71 29 6.3:1 
Ironically, agency attorneys revealed less concern than did industry 
attorneys about the adequacy of agency time and resources. With respect 
to agency behavior, however, agency attorneys fell in line with 
institutional theory in expressing tremendous support for agency 
performance—far more so than did the industry attorneys. Moreover, with 
government attorneys accounting for most of the favorable opinion of 
agency performance (notwithstanding their lower representation numbers 
in the survey), the negative perception of agency use of science among 
industry attorneys was remarkably deep and broadly shared.  
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Our survey reveals a sharp difference of opinion between agency 
lawyers and lawyers representing industry about agency use of science. 
Interest groups associated with environmental causes, however, also hold 
to the faith that agencies may not adequately ground their decisions in 
science. Studies have shown that support for peer review under the ESA, 
for example, is strong in both the industry and the environmental camps, 
but such support is almost always limited to applying review to the types 
of decisions each interest group finds the most troublesome. Dr. Deborah 
Brosnan has found, for example, that more than sixty prominent lobbying 
groups representing a diverse array of interests actively supported using 
peer review under the ESA, but that “each group favors review of actions 
that it finds unpalatable. Development groups want fewer species listings 
and therefore demand review of listing decisions. . . . Environmental 
groups are concerned about habitat loss under HCPs and want them 
independently reviewed.”97  
Indeed, in recent years some of the most vocal critics of agency use of 
science are scientists and environmental groups, who have made 
widespread allegations that political appointees in the Bush administration 
have forced agency scientists to manipulate, suppress, and distort scientific 
data.98 One group of prominent scientists endorsed a statement accusing 
the Bush Administration in general of misusing science.99 Democratic 
members of Congress have produced reports accusing agencies of 
intentional suppression and distortion of scientific data100 and of practicing 
“weird science.”101 Even scientists within NOAA have recently claimed 
that they have witnessed outright suppression and distortion of science 
within their agency.102 In short, the perception that agencies rely on 
inadequate scientific support for their decisions has begun to transcend 
neat political boxes.  
 97. Deborah M. Brosnan, Can Peer Review Help Resolve Natural Resource Conflicts?, 16 
ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 32, 33 (2000). 
 98. See generally MOONEY, supra note 13, at 14–24, 78–248. 
 99. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity Statement Signatories, http://www. 
ucsusa.org/RSI_list/index.php (last visited apr. 2, 2006). For the scientists’ statement, see Union of 
Concerned Scientists, Restoring Scientific Integrity in Policymaking (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www. 
ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/scientists-signon-statement.html.  
 100. See MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 
POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
reform/min/politicsandscience/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_science_rep.pdf. 
 101. See DEMOCRATIC STAFF, H. COMM. ON RES., WEIRD SCIENCE: THE INTERIOR 
DEPARTMENT’S MANIPULATION OF SCIENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES (2002), available at 
http://www.ourforests.org/weirdscience.pdf. 
 102. See Officials, Scientists Spar over Whether Politics Trumps Science at NMFS, ENDANGERED 
SPECIES & WETLANDS REP., June 2005, at 14, 14. 
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It is not surprising that different denominations share the faith that 
agencies sometimes oversell the extent to which science supports their 
decisions. Regulatory agencies deal with so many issues affecting so many 
interest groups that an agency will eventually offend almost every interest 
group with whom it deals enough times to raise the group’s concern over 
the use of science in decisions that went against them. Perhaps in each 
matter it depends on whose ox the agency gores, but over time, if the 
agency gores everyone’s ox, the reliability of agency use of science can 
become fair game for all. But the breadth of this perception does not itself 
explain the extensive support for regulatory peer review. Here again, 
however, we found what appears to be a strong set of beliefs in the merit 
of regulatory peer review and what it could accomplish. Figure 3 shows 
the extent to which practitioners of environmental law view regulatory 
peer review as an answer to the perceived misuse of science by agencies: 
Figure 3. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they 
agree or disagree with the following statements about the potential 
effects of applying regulatory peer review to proposed regulatory 
decisions. Figures show the percent of respondents in each category. 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
No 
Opinion
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
a. It is likely to lead to substantial 
improvements in the quality of agency 
decisions. 
28 46 15 9 2 
b. It is likely to reveal significant flaws in 
the ways agencies generally search for, 
select, or use scientific data. 
25 41 14 17 3 
c. It is likely to improve public confidence 
in agency decisions. 28 42 16 11 3 
The perception that regulatory peer review is the answer to agency 
misuse of science appears to be overwhelming, with well over 65% 
agreeing that it will improve the quality of agency decisions, expose flaws 
in agency use of science, and improve public confidence in agencies, and 
only 20% or less disagreeing that each of those expected benefits will 
accrue. Yet, given how little regulatory peer review is employed today in 
agency practice, what is the foundation for this set of beliefs?  
Once again, it appears to be little more than faith, for most of our 
respondents had never had direct contact with regulatory peer review. 
Over 60% of our respondents had neither represented a client in a matter 
undergoing regulatory peer review nor advocated about whether to adopt 
regulatory peer review nor even counseled a client generally about what 
regulatory peer review is. Indeed, as further support that views on 
regulatory peer review are largely based on faith, we were not surprised to 
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find that government and industry attorneys had different expectations 
about the effects of regulatory peer review, as shown in Figure 4, though 
we were shocked by the degree of disagreement.  
Figure 4. The second column shows which group (federal or state 
government career (Govt) or private firm/in-house corporate career 
(Corp)), was significantly more likely to agree with the statement in 
the first column (i.e., answer “strongly agree” or “somewhat 
agree”), based on the breakdown between the two groups who 
agreed (third and fourth columns). To indicate the strength of the 
difference, if any, between the two groups, the fifth column shows 
the odds that a person selected randomly from the more likely group 
would agree with the statement compared to a person selected 
randomly from the less likely group. 
 
 
More Likely 
to Agree 
% agreeing that 
were Govt 
% agreeing that 
were Corp 
Odds 
a. It is likely to lead to substantial 
improvements in the quality of agency 
decisions 
Corp 16 84 33.3:1 
b. It is likely to reveal significant flaws in 
the ways agencies generally search for, 
select, or use scientific data 
Corp 22 78 12.5:1 
c. It is likely to improve public confidence 
in agency decisions Corp 19 81 20:1 
Government attorneys, according to our results, simply do not buy into 
the idea that regulatory peer review has anything salutary to offer their 
work. But with industry attorneys twelve times more likely than agency 
attorneys to believe regulatory peer review will expose flaws in agency 
procedures, twenty times more likely to believe it will improve public 
confidence in agencies, and thirty-three times more likely to believe it will 
improve the quality of agency decisions, can agencies afford to ignore the 
magnitude of pro-peer-review sentiment that appears to have taken hold 
among those who practice before them?  
C. Meeting the Demand 
Our survey results suggest that demand for regulatory peer review is 
strong among experienced practitioners of regulatory law, particularly 
those who represent industry clients before agencies. Responding to that 
demand, the Bush Administration has supported the policy that federal 
agencies broadly employ more rigorous peer review in their decision 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1 Ruhl Salzman book pages.doc 9/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
32 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
making processes.103 Indeed the centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s 
“sound science” push has been OMB’s peer review policy. Based 
ostensibly on authority granted in the Data Quality Act,104 OMB’s 
approach requires federal agencies to conduct “a peer review of influential 
scientific information” and of “highly influential scientific assessments” 
an agency disseminates to the public.105 In its initial September 2003 
proposal, OMB claimed this mandate would “improve the quality, 
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the 
Federal Government to the public,” because it would “provide a vital 
second opinion on the science that underlies federal regulation.”106  
OMB responded to a wide range of comments on its initial proposal107 
and published a revised proposal in April, 2004.108 Deleting its prior 
assertion that regulatory peer review is tantamount to a “second opinion,” 
OMB then asserted that peer review would evaluate: 
the clarity of hypotheses, the validity of the research design, the 
quality of the data collection procedures, the robustness of the 
methods employed, the appropriateness of the methods for the 
hypotheses being tested, the extent to which the conclusions follow 
from the analysis, and the strengths and limitations of the overall 
product.109
 103. See Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,230, 23,230 (Apr. 
28, 2004) (“[P]eer review improves both the quality of scientific information and the public’s 
confidence in the integrity of science.”); Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 
68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,024 (Sept. 15, 2003) (“Independent, objective peer review has long been 
regarded as a critical element in ensuring the reliability of scientific analyses.”). 
 104. The Data Quality Act, also known as the Information Quality Act, is actually a set of 
provisions embedded in a 2001 appropriations bill, and requires, among other things, that OMB “issue 
guidelines . . . that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and 
maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information . . . disseminated by Federal 
agencies . . . .” consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A-153 to 54 (2000). For a history of the political figures and events that led to the Data Quality 
Act, see MOONEY, supra note 13, at 102–20.  
 105. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2675 (Jan. 14, 2005). 
Some observers have questioned OMB’s authority to require peer review. See Shapiro, supra note 25, 
at 10,064–65.  
 106. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,023-24 
(Sept. 15, 2003). 
 107. Public comments on the OMB Proposed Bulletin are posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/inforeg/2003iq/iq_list.html.  
 108. Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer Review, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,230–31. 
 109. Id. at 23,231. 
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OMB received more comments on the revised policy,110 though far 
fewer than on the original proposal, and adopted a final policy in 
December 2004 with relatively minor refinements.111 Under the final 
policy, agency information subject to review would include data, synthesis 
of facts, models, analyses, and assessments that would “have a clear and 
substantial impact on important public policies or private sector 
decisions.”112 This could range from state of science reports, meta-
analyses, and risk assessments to toxicity profiles and health and ecology 
assessments.113 Not all science underpinning decisions can be peer 
reviewed, of course, and OMB’s strictest peer-review requirements are 
reserved for science affecting decisions with $500 million of regulatory or 
private-sector impact, novel, precedent-setting impact; or significant 
interagency interest.114 If the data have already been subject to adequate 
peer review (e.g., journal review), no further review is needed.115 
Otherwise, the agency must apply internal or external peer review by 
technical experts not associated with the work product and must provide a 
summary or copy of comments to the public.116 The agency must publicly 
respond to the peer review report, and in some cases public comment and 
hearing on the draft peer review report may be appropriate.117
On the legislative side, a series of “sound science” reform bills have 
been proposed in Congress to amend the ESA. The Sound Science for 
Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002,118 introduced by 
Representative James Hansen (R-Utah), is the genesis of a line of such 
legislation that has followed in similar spirit.119 In general, these proposals 
would alter the procedures, standards of evidence, and burdens of proof 
under which federal agencies operate in carrying out ESA programs.120 
The legislation would stiffen ESA procedures in many respects, requiring 
FWS and NOAA to give preference to certain forms of evidence and apply 
 110. Public comments on the OMB Revised Bulletin are posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/inforeg/peer2004/list_peer2004.html.  
 111. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14, 2005). 
 112. Id. at 2667. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 2671. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 2675. 
 117. Id. at 2672. 
 118. H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 119. For a more recent version, see H.R. 1662, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 369, 108th Cong. (2003). 
For a history of peer review provisions in ESA reform bills preceding H.R. 4840, see Michael J. 
Brennan et al., Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of the “Best Scientific Data Available” 
Standard in the Endangered Species Act, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 433–40 (2003). 
 120. See Burke, supra note 8, at 506–07. 
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more rigorous burdens of proof to a long list of specified decisions.121 In 
particular, the bills would require FWS and NOAA to give greater weight 
to field-tested and peer-reviewed data, accept data from affected 
landowners, solicit data on recovery plans, and, most important, subject 
every listing, critical habitat, recovery plan, and consultation decision to 
peer review by a three-expert panel.122 The resulting process would 
institute a much more formal and probing peer review process for many 
more ESA decisions than FWS imposed on itself under its internal 1994 
peer review policy.  
The proposed ESA reforms have enjoyed strong support123 and 
engendered equally strident criticism.124 Testimony from agency officials 
generally supported the reforms with only minor suggested changes.125 
The House Resources Committee held hearings on Representative 
Hansen’s bill in June 2002126 and reported it favorably on July 10, 2002, 
in a 22–18 vote that largely followed party lines.127 Peer review proposals 
like the ESA bills continue to have considerable traction in Congress.128  
OMB and Congress offer no empirical evidence for their rush to meet 
the demand for regulatory peer review. But so what? The institutional 
theory supporting the case for peer review is practically a given in 
administrative law scholarship,129 and the perception that agencies 
overstate how far their science gets them appears to be widely held by 
attorneys and interest groups that appear before regulatory agencies.130 In 
politics, that is usually more than enough. The debate has not been one-
 121. See H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002) § 2. 
 122. See id. §§ 2–3.  
 123. See, e.g., NAT’L ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM COAL., H.R. 4840, the Sound Science 
for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002, http://www.nesarc.org/walden.htm (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2006) (providing links to several relevant sites). 
 124. See, e.g., Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, Statement by Rodger Schlickeisen President 
of Defenders of Wildlife on Committee Markup HR 4840, a Bill that Purports to Offer “Sound 
Science” for ESA (July 11, 2002), http://www.defenders.org/releases/pr2002/pr071102.html (calling 
the proposal “one more effort by the ‘development at any environmental cost’ crowd to gut the ESA”). 
 125. See http://laws.fws.gov/testimon/2001/main2001.html (resonating that “sound science” has 
become a theme across many programs in the Bush Administration).  
 126. “Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002”: Hearing on H.R. 4840 
Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. (2002).  
 127. See Press Release, Nat’l Endangered Species Act Reform Coal., ESA Victory: Sound Science 
Legislation Passes House Resources Committee (July 11, 2002), http://www.nesarc.org/4840alert.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003). 
 128. See, e.g., H.R. 4940, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006); H.R. 5018, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006) (proposing 
peer review for agency decisions about fisheries management). 
 129. See supra Part III.A. 
 130. See supra Part III.B. 
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sided, however, for there are significant objections to imposing regulatory 
peer review. These are explored in the next section. 
IV. THE CASE AGAINST PEER REVIEW 
Critics of mandating regulatory peer review have advanced two 
positions: First, evidence that agencies frequently overstate the extent to 
which science supports a regulatory decision is insufficient. Second, 
absent such evidence, even if there is a problem, they argue, peer review is 
not the solution but rather a practice to be avoided at all costs. Not only 
will it fail to provide the promised benefits, they argue, but it will further 
politicize the decision making process and slow the agency process to the 
point of frustrating agencies’ missions to protect the public welfare. They 
may be right in some circumstances, but when examined closely these 
arguments turn out to rest on simply a different faith than the one held by 
the supporters of regulatory peer review. 
A. There is No Problem  
As discussed above, our survey revealed that attorneys representing 
agencies tend to believe that regulatory agencies adequately describe the 
scientific support for their regulatory decisions which, if true, means there 
is no justification for adding the burden of regulatory peer review. To 
evaluate this position carefully, however, it is critical to distinguish 
between cases in which an agency produces or employs “bad science” and 
cases in which an agency misuses “good science.” For example, Wendy 
Wagner asserts that “the examples of regulatory bad science are winnowed 
down to a few, virtually all of which are contested.”131 This assertion 
refers, however, to the quality of science an agency has produced or relied 
on—e.g., whether the data were biased or whether the agency ignored 
relevant data—not whether the agency has taken what might be perfectly 
credible science and stretched it too far to support a policy decision.132 
Moreover, studies of agency practices with respect to science do not cover 
“the larger universe of regulatory decisions involving the grant of permits 
and licenses,”133 which is, of course, a principal target of many current 
 131. Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 73; see Sidney Shapiro, The Case Against the IQA, 
ENVTL. F., July/Aug. 2005, at 26, 28. 
 132. See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 73–77. Of course, Wagner was the first to 
comprehensively explore the institutional reasons why agencies may overstate the extent to which 
science supports their policy decisions. See Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 13.  
 133. See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 73. 
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proposals for regulatory peer review. In fact, no critique of regulatory peer 
review has presented empirical evidence based on systematic, objective 
analysis of how accurately agencies apply science—perhaps perfectly 
sound science—in this meaningful universe of regulatory decisions.  
Hence, although there is substantial evidence that agencies do not 
systematically produce or use flawed scientific evidence, there is almost 
no empirical evidence on the question of how agencies use the available 
credible science to support their policy decisions, particularly in 
permitting and licensing decisions. Indeed, if the argument were simply 
that there has been no comprehensive empirical examination of whether 
and how often agencies overstate the support science lends to their policy 
decisions, we would agree. As the previous section shows, however, such 
an assertion is not an adequate rebuttal of the case for regulatory peer 
review. One might argue that the burden is on advocates of regulatory peer 
review to produce empirical proof that agencies frequently exhibit this 
problem, in which case that burden unquestionably has not been met.134 
But why place the burden of empirical proof on the side that wishes to 
apply a bedrock principle of science with a 300-year tradition to agencies 
that base their decisions in whole or in part on science? Given how crucial 
peer review is to the scientific method, given the institutional forces that 
suggest agencies may often overstate how far science gets them, and given 
the belief held by many industry and environmental interests alike that 
agencies in fact do so, it is not unreasonable to expect critics of regulatory 
peer review to demonstrate that what is good for science is ill-advised for 
regulation. Observing that a data vacuum exists does not meet this burden.  
B. If There Is a Problem, Peer Review Is Not the Solution 
Our survey also revealed that attorneys representing agencies as the 
primary focus of their careers generally do not believe regulatory peer 
review can improve agency decisions or public confidence in them. This is 
the fallback theme of most critiques of regulatory peer review. For 
example, in response to OMB’s initial proposal for regulatory peer review, 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science issued a 
resolution condemning the proposal on several grounds, including that 
“there is no evidence that proposed new procedures are likely to improve 
 134. Wagner points this out with respect to the charge that agencies practice poor science, see id. 
at 76–79 (demonstrating “the failure of the reformers themselves to document a problem” with respect 
to poor agency practice of science). 
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the quality of science used in the regulatory process.”135 Of course, there is 
no evidence regulatory peer review is unlikely to do so either. Yet, putting 
aside the issue of which side bears the burden of proof in this regard, on 
this score the critics of regulatory peer review have some strong 
institutional reasons for suggesting caution in its use.  
One concern is that advocates of regulatory peer review promise too 
much and thus distort the public’s expectations of agency practices. Recall 
that Representative Walden and the OMB’s initial peer review proposal 
both portrayed regulatory peer review as a “second opinion.”136 That 
sounds pretty attractive—after all, who would not want a second opinion 
before amputating a limb? But peer review does not provide a second 
opinion in the conventional sense. Medical doctors providing a second 
opinion examine the patient, not just the other doctor’s written diagnosis. 
Scientists providing peer review for professional journals do not “examine 
the patient” in the form of conducting independent experimentation or data 
analysis. As Lars Noah has described, “policymakers often seem to 
conflate peer review with science itself, which in turn may lead them to 
exaggerate the possible utility of independent expert scrutiny of decisions 
based on science.”137  
This concern is particularly acute in regulatory settings in which the 
best available science is likely to prove inconclusive, forcing the agency to 
rely on professional judgment to interpret the data and then, when 
permitted or required, to employ other policy considerations to reach a 
final decision. Regulatory peer review will not close the data gaps.138 If 
advocates of regulatory peer review suggest otherwise, they oversell to the 
public what regulatory peer review really offers.  
This leads to another concern—that, far from advocates’ claims that 
peer review will eliminate bias from agency decisions, it will actually 
exacerbate these concerns by allowing agencies to mask their biases with 
the veneer of science. Agencies themselves can misuse peer review. The 
ESA provides a particularly illustrative example. FWS and NOAA have 
long been criticized for operating a black-box style of decision making—
relatively closed to the public, reliant on informal channels of scientific 
communication, and generally unwilling to communicate their data and 
 135. Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Science AAAS Resolution: On the MB Proposed Peer 
Review Bulletin (Mar. 9, 2004), http://archives.aaas.org/docs/resolutions.php?doc_id=434.  
 136. See supra notes 19, 86 and accompanying text. 
 137. Noah, supra note 25, at 1046. 
 138. Indeed, as we point out in Part V, if anything, regulatory peer review will expose the data 
gaps and sharpen the differentiation between science and policy as the bases for agency decisions, 
which we consider the strongest reason to use it. 
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scientific reasoning in a manner that facilitates review by the public and 
the courts.139 The 1994 peer review policy, described earlier,140 was 
intended to fix that—to instill greater confidence in the public and the 
courts. These agencies pledged to “incorporate independent peer review in 
listing and recovery activities.”141 This step would involve “[s]olicit[ing] 
the expert opinions of three appropriate and independent specialists 
regarding pertinent scientific or commercial data and assumptions relating 
to the taxonomy, population models, and supportive biological and 
ecological information for species under consideration for listing.”142 With 
this, the agencies proclaimed to have put the attributes of peer review into 
motion.  
In 2003, however, the GAO conducted a study of how FWS had 
implemented the peer review policy.143 Its findings were disturbing. 
Perhaps most important, the process was informal and actually seemed to 
invite bias. The report noted that FWS “officials told us that they have not 
adopted a formal procedure to assess peer reviewers’ independence, and 
the [FWS] does not publicly disclose . . . potential conflicts or prior 
involvement by its peer reviewers.”144 Although the agency guidelines 
explained that “[i]ndependent peer reviewers should be selected from the 
academic and scientific community, Tribal and other native American 
groups, Federal and State agencies, and the private sector,” and that “those 
selected [should] have demonstrated expertise and specialized knowledge 
related to the scientific area under consideration,”145 it was the agencies 
who selected their peer reviewers, reviewed the peer reviews, and reported 
the results of the peer reviews.146 The GAO found that FWS “[p]eer 
reviewers are selected at the discretion of the field office scientists 
responsible for developing listing and critical habitat decisions.”147 Not 
 139. See Doremus, supra note 37, at 1082–87.  
 140. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.  
 141. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy 
for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270, 34,270 (July 1, 1994).  
 142. Id. 
 143. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-803, ENDANGERED SPECIES: FISH AND WILDLIFE 
SERVICE USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE LISTING DECISIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE 
NEEDED FOR CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS (2003). 
 144. Id. at 16.  
 145. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy 
for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 34,270 (July 1, 1994). 
 146. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to Reclassify and 
Remove the Gray Wolf from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife in Portions of the 
Conterminous United States, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,804, 15,819–20 (Apr. 1, 2003) (discussing FWS’s use of 
the peer review process in connection with a decision about the status of gray wolves (Canis lupus)). 
 147. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 143, at 15. By contrast, the NRC peer review policy, 
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surprisingly, the study noted that the peer reviewers chosen by FWS 
usually agreed with the agency’s positions.148 Without clearly independent 
reviewers, this process and its results are open to charges of 
manipulation.149  
Ironically, OMB provides no more encouraging an example in its own 
actions. OMB has been required since 1997 to provide Congress an 
accounting statement and a report on the guidelines it has issued 
estimating the total annual costs and benefits of agency regulation and 
analyzing the impact of regulation on small businesses, local, state and 
tribal governments, and economic growth.150 In 2000, Congress required 
OMB to ensure an “independent and external peer review of the guidelines 
and each accounting statement and associated report.”151 Research by 
Joanna Goger on OMB’s peer review practice has revealed that the 
process has no internal guidelines, no conflict of interest disclosure 
requirements, repeatedly uses the same reviewers, and has no requirement 
of balance.152 One reviewer wrote to OMB following his review of the 
2001 report, “[a]t this point, you are likely getting tired of my comments 
so that next year you might want to bring on a new reviewer in my 
place.”153 Beyond the problem of hypocrisy—this process clearly fails to 
satisfy the procedures called for in OMB’s proposal that other agencies 
must follow—is the institutional concern that OMB seems to have 
under which the Klamath Committee was formed, provides: 
[t]he Research Council does not permit governmental agencies that sponsor projects to select 
committee members because of the institution’s commitment to ensuring independence and 
objectivity in carrying out its work. However, sponsors can and often do suggest nominees, 
some of whom may be selected. Such a selection could be made when the individuals 
nominated by a sponsor have the expertise, knowledge, and stature required and can be 
expected to participate in a committee’s work without being subjected to undue influence or 
pressure from the sponsoring agency. 
Nat’l Acadamies, THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL PROCESS, http://www.nationalacademies.org/ 
about/faq4.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).  
 148. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 143, at 21–22. 
 149. For example, the ability of an author to suggest or exclude reviewers in the scientific-journal-
publishing context has been shown to increase the chances of being selected for publication. See David 
Grimm, Suggesting or Excluding Reviewers Can Help Get Your Paper Published, 309 SCIENCE 1974, 
1974 (2005). 
 150. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-59, REGULATORY ACCOUNTING: ANALYSIS 
OF OMB’S REPORTS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION 14–15 (1999). The 
OMB example is based on the presentation of Joanna B. Goger, Peer Review of OMB’s Cost-Benefit 
Reports to Congress, Center for Progressive Regulation workshop, Baltimore, MD (Apr. 16, 2004) 
(presentation slides on file with authors). 
 151. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624(d), 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A-162 (2000). 
 152. Goger, supra note 150. 
 153. Id. 
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followed the FWS example of cherry-picking reviewers. This suggests that 
agencies may systematically tend to use peer review to support their 
decisions rather than as a critical outside check on the accuracy of their 
decisions. In its worst extremes, then, peer review can become a cynical 
exercise, allowing agencies to manipulate the process and rig outcomes to 
justify agency decisions that might not withstand legitimate peer scrutiny.  
The final major institutional critique of regulatory peer review is, even 
if the preceding concerns—that peer review will not improve agency 
decisions and will be politically manipulated—are mistaken, the demand 
on resources needed to carry out reviews will significantly delay 
regulatory decisions. This is the “paralysis by analysis” charge leveled 
against other broad, mandatory regulatory procedures such as cost-benefit 
analysis and risk assessments, criticized as “offering regulatory relief for 
industry in the guise of more rational procedures.”154 Inflexibly mandating 
rigorous peer review adds substantial demands on agency resources, 
potentially draining resources from other decision making components 
and, in many cases, impeding decision making altogether.155  
Indeed, the statutory and regulatory deadlines frequently placed on 
agency decision making acknowledge the pressing need in many cases to 
intervene on policy problems.156 Agencies already have difficulty meeting 
those deadlines,157 and adding peer review steps to the process is unlikely 
to improve that experience. If regulatory peer review were to lengthen the 
decision process, it is possible in some cases that an agency would be 
unable to act before it is too late, for example, allowing an endangered 
species to move ever closer to extinction while the agencies engage in 
further process. In the context of regulatory regimes in which decision 
 154. Noah, supra note 25, at 1068; see also Randolph J. May, OMB’s Peer Review Proposal—
Swamped by Science?, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2004, at 4, 4–5 (describing mandatory peer 
review as “an invitation for regulatory ossification”). 
 155. Thus twenty former high-level agency officials, including former EPA directors Carol 
Browner and Russell Train, signed a letter to OMB stating that implementation of the OMB “proposal 
would lead to increased costs and delays in disseminating information to the public and in 
promulgating health, safety, environmental and other regulations.” Letter from Carol M. Browner et 
al., to Joshua B. Bollen, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Jan. 9, 2004), http://www.progressive 
regulation.org/articles/Letter_Bolten_Sig.pdf.  
 156. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2000) (ESA deadlines for listing of species and designating 
critical habitat); Id. § 1536(b) (deadlines for interagency consultations).  
 157. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-93, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MORE FEDERAL 
MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS 14–17 (2003), 
(explaining how frequently the agencies exceed deadlines applicable to consultation under Section 
7(a)(2) of the ESA).  
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time matters, mandatory regulatory peer review may well cause greater 
harms of omission than of commission.158  
Figure 5. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they agree or disagree with the following statements about the 
potential effects of applying regulatory peer review to proposed 
regulatory decisions. Figures show the percentage of respondents in 
each category. 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
No 
Opinion 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree
a. It is likely substantially to slow down 
agency decisionmaking processes. 17 47 15 18 3 
b. It is likely to add substantially to the 
costs of agency decisionmaking. 
 
10 47 16 23 4 
c. It is likely to add substantially to the 
incidence of litigation over agency 
decisions. 
7 19 17 45 12 
d. It is likely to lead to erosion of agency 
personnel morale. 
 
3 17 29 40 10 
e. It is likely to deter agencies from 
making the kinds of decisions that are 
subject to regulatory peer review. 
9 31 30 23 7 
f. It is likely to be subject to manipulation 
by agencies to serve their interests. 8 40 28 19 5 
g. It is likely to be subject to manipulation 
by interest groups to serve their interests.  24 37 20 16 3 
Our survey showed that many practitioners do in fact believe that one 
or more of these three major concerns about regulatory peer review are 
likely to occur, as shown in Figure 5. The results indicated no surprising 
differences of opinion on these issues between government and industry 
attorneys. As shown in Figure 6, industry attorneys are more likely to 
believe regulatory peer review will slow down agency work and be subject 
to manipulation, and government attorneys are more likely to believe it 
will add to litigation and erode agency morale; the two groups agreed that 
regulatory peer review would likely add to agency costs, and were equally 
mixed in feeling it would steer agencies away from making decisions 
subject to peer review.  
Figure 6: The second column shows which group (federal or state 
government career (Govt) or private firm/in-house corporate career 
 
 
 158. See McGarvey & Marshall, supra note 7, at 108–09 (suggesting this is a serious concern 
under the ESA). 
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(Corp)) was significantly more likely to agree with the statement in 
the first column (i.e., answer “strongly agree” or “somewhat 
agree”), based on the breakdown between the two groups who 
agreed (third and fourth columns). To indicate the strength of the 
difference, if any, between the two groups, the fifth column shows 
the odds that a person selected randomly from the more likely group 
would agree with the statement compared to a person selected 
randomly from the less likely group. 
 
 
More Likely to 
Agree 
% agreeing that 
were Govt 
% agreeing that
were Corp 
Odds 
a. It is likely substantially to slow 
down agency decision making 
processes. 
Corp 37  63 3:1 
b. It is likely to add substantially to 
the costs of agency decision making. Neither    
c. It is likely to add substantially to 
the incidence of litigation over agency 
decisions. 
Govt 71 29 6.2:1 
d. It is likely to lead to erosion of 
agency personnel morale.  Govt 70 30 5.5:1 
e. It is likely to deter agencies from 
making the kinds of decisions that are 
subject to regulatory peer review. 
Neither    
f. It is likely to be subject to 
manipulation by agencies to serve 
their interests. 
Corp 35 65 3.6:1 
g. It is likely to be subject to 
manipulation by interest groups to 
serve their interests.  
Corp 37 63 2.9:1 
Overall, therefore, the arguments against regulatory peer review, while 
not based on persuasive empirical evidence, do find support in basic 
institutional theory and in perceptions that are widely held among 
experienced practitioners of regulatory law. Hence, while the case for 
regulatory peer review seems to deserve serious consideration, so too does 
the case for proceeding with caution. Indeed, most of our respondents 
agreed that, on balance, the costs of regulatory peer review would not 
significantly outweigh the benefits.159 Rather than never employing 
regulatory peer review, or employing it all the time, a balanced approach 
seems appropriate.  
 
 
 159. Fifty-four percent of our survey respondents disagreed with the statement that “the likely 
costs (such as slowing down agency decisions) would significantly outweigh the likely benefits (such 
as improving the quality of agency data selection),” whereas only 29 percent agreed and 16 percent 
had no opinion. Government attorneys were almost three times more likely to agree with the statement 
than were industry attorneys. 
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Yet peer review has become a pawn in a much larger debate over the 
appropriate roles of science and policy in our society.160 As such, its 
supporters and its opponents alike overstate its advantages and 
disadvantages.161 There is little question increased use of regulatory peer 
review would detect some cases of agency failure, but it could also create 
considerable drag on agency process. After all, the Klamath Committee 
confidently concluded that the federal agencies acted without scientific 
foundation, but it took time and money to reach that conclusion. Most of 
the asserted promises and pitfalls of regulatory peer review, however, are 
posited in an empirical vacuum. In short, how much benefit or burden to 
expect from wholesale or strategic application of regulatory peer review to 
administrative decisions is really unknown. 
V. RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF REGULATORY PEER REVIEW 
Since any discussion of regulatory peer review must be premised, for 
now, on theory and perception rather than empirical evidence, it is 
important to think clearly about how to balance countervailing concerns, 
particularly given the high level of political interest in taking action. In 
assessing any specific proposal, therefore, three overarching questions 
about regulatory peer review must be addressed: (1) what are its most 
important potential benefits; (2) where in the regulatory process should it 
be applied to maximize these benefits; and (3) under what conditions 
would it most likely substantially hinder or otherwise undermine agency 
process?  
A. Defining Potential Benefits 
Most of the fog surrounding regulatory peer review arises from the 
proclivity of almost everyone involved in the debate to conflate science 
and policy, as if agencies make one holistic conclusion about each 
particular regulatory decision. After the Klamath Committee issued its 
report, for example, one FWS official concluded, accurately, that the 
Committee “didn’t say the science proves we were wrong; they just said 
there wasn’t enough science to prove us right.”162 In science, of course, 
that is enough—one generally does not get published in scientific journals 
based on a claim that one’s research did not prove anything. Yet, the FWS 
 160. See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 162. Michael Grunwald, Scientific Report Roils a Salmon War, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2002, at A1. 
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official clearly took solace in the peer review’s finding a lack of scientific 
support for the agency’s position rather than finding that scientific data 
actually refuted the agency’s position. 
The difference, for regulatory decisions at least, is grounded in the 
policy component of administrative decisions. In fact, Congress rarely 
commands that an agency decision be based solely on scientific evidence 
conclusively proving the decision correct. In the Klamath setting, for 
example, the decision FWS was required to make involved an evaluation 
of whether the Bureau of Reclamation’s proposed water diversions would 
jeopardize the continued existence of the protected fish species,163 and 
Congress has commanded that FWS use the “best scientific and 
commercial data available” to make that decision.164 This standard’s 
“obvious purpose . . . is to ensure that the ESA not be implemented 
haphazardly, on the basis of speculation or surmise.”165 But that does not 
preclude an agency’s well-reasoned use of professional judgment in the 
face of incomplete scientific evidence. Frequently, perhaps most of the 
time, it will be the case that an agency must use some basis in addition to 
the best scientific data available for reaching a jeopardy decision. In some 
regulatory settings Congress might prescribe additional policy-based 
factors, such as cost-benefit analysis, that an agency must meld with its 
scientific analysis to reach a final regulatory decision.166 In other cases, 
such as the ESA jeopardy analysis, it may come down simply to the 
agency’s exercise of professional judgment about which way to lean when 
the science is not definitive in either direction, jeopardy or nonjeopardy. 
Indeed, FWS and NOAA frequently have stated that they will err on the 
side of the species in such cases.167 This may be a perfectly appropriate 
policy decision, but it forecloses the agency’s use of science to prove itself 
right in particular cases. 
The problem is that agencies might not make explicit the policy-based 
preferences or findings underlying their decisions. In the Klamath 
experience, for example, neither FWS nor NOAA presented any basis to 
 163. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). 
 164. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2),(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (2005).  
 165. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997). 
 166. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (requiring cost-benefit analysis for designation of critical 
habitat under the ESA). 
 167. See Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Final Rule, 51 
Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,952 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) (“[T]he Service must 
provide the ‘benefit of the doubt’ to the species concerned.”); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L 
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR 
CONDUCTING CONSULTATION AND CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT 1–6 (1998), available at http://endangered.fws.gov/consultations/s7hndbk/s7hndbk.htm.  
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the Klamath Committee other than science for their respective 
decisions.168 In other words, once the Klamath Committee “said there 
wasn’t enough science to prove us right,”169 the agencies were left 
speechless—they had articulated no reasoned alternative basis to justify 
their decisions that led directly to the termination of irrigation water. It is 
not clear whether the agencies believed their scientific explanation was 
airtight, and thus no professional judgment was needed, or whether they 
simply believed enough science was presented that nobody would ask for 
additional justification. Had the Klamath Committee not conducted its 
peer review, nobody would have asked, at least not in any way that would 
have been likely to succeed in demonstrating the lack of scientific support 
for the agencies’ positions.  
Hence one benefit—perhaps the chief benefit—that could reasonably 
be expected to derive from the use of regulatory peer review is that it 
would encourage agencies to provide sharper delineations between 
scientific and policy bases for decisions. Agencies should be loathe to 
have science prove their decisions wrong, but should also take no pride 
when science fails to prove their decisions correct and no other supporting 
basis exists in the decision record. This is not to say that science alone 
must ever conclusively prove an agency right in order for its decision to be 
consistent with statutory expectations. Rather, it is important that agencies 
not overstate, either by commission or omission, the role science plays in 
justifying their decisions relative to non-scientific, policy-driven bases. In 
short, the public ought to know how far science takes the agency in 
support of its decision, and what beyond science fills any gaps.  
It is not just our survey’s potentially biased industry attorneys who 
believe this is an important goal of administrative law. A National 
Research Council committee of experts recently convened to review the 
scientific support for federal agency management decisions in the Platte 
River Basin explained the difficulty agencies face in integrating 
incomplete and inconclusive science into regulatory decisions that involve 
value judgments.170 The committee observed that the policy aspects of 
such decisions  
are not scientific in the sense that they could, even in theory, be 
decided solely through evaluation of empirical, objectively gathered 
 168. This is based on J.B. Ruhl’s personal experience as a member of the Klamath Committee. 
 169. Grunwald, supra note 162. 
 170. See COMM. ON ENDANGERED & THREATENED SPECIES IN THE PLATTE RIVER BASIN, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES OF THE PLATTE RIVER 92–100 (2005). 
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data. They require social or political value judgments that are 
inevitably subjective. The committee believes that these judgments 
should be made transparent; that is, [an agency] should clearly 
explain in a decision document both its evaluation of the scientific 
data and its use of nonscientific factors to reach a final decision.171
Similarly, Cary Coglianese and Gary Marchant recently observed that  
[e]mbedded within any bare claim that a policy decision is “based 
on” science, or that science “leads to” a particular policy choice, 
will be some underlying normative position. If the core normative 
dimension to any policy decision is camouflaged in science, the 
resulting policy outcomes, as well as any explanations or 
rationalizations offered in their defense, will likely be inconsistent if 
not unreasonable.172
If a sharper delineation between science-based and policy-based 
support for decisions is seen as a benefit in the regulatory context, one 
would be hard-pressed to identify a better method for sharpening that line 
than regulatory peer review.173 As a committee of scientists speaking on 
behalf of the Society for Conservation Biology observed well before the 
peer review debate flew into high gear: 
Independent scientific review (ISR) can help ensure that 
environmental decisions and policy making reflect the best 
scientific knowledge of the day. Most environmental issues are 
burdened with historical momentum, economic implications, and 
cultural values that may dominate decision making in the absence of 
scientific information. An ISR can help decision makers focus on 
the oxbjective [sic], scientific variables apart from economic, 
historical, or cultural factors and to interpret issues in the context of 
great ecological complexity and uncertainty. Also ISR can raise the 
level of public trust in the process, alleviating fears that industries, 
environmental protection organizations, or government agencies are 
 171. Id. at 99–100.  
 172. Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk 
Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1360 (2004). 
 173. As Professors Doremus and Tarlock observe, “[a]ppropriate outside review which generates 
a publicly available report can . . . make scientific, political, and even management judgments more 
transparent.” Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 16, at 32; see also Holly Doremus, Science Plays 
Defense: Natural Resources Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 302 
(2005) (“Peer review . . . can, under the best circumstances, also increase transparency by pointing out 
limitations in the data, unconventional scientific judgments, or places where policy judgments must 
have been made.”). 
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simply promoting their own interests or moving ahead without 
benefit of relevant scientific information.174  
And this message from the scientific community has persisted through 
the throes of the debate. Yet another National Research Council committee 
recently concluded, for example, that peer review when properly 
conducted is a critical component of the objectivity, transparency, and 
openness desired to instill public confidence in regulatory decisions.175  
Perhaps it is time to start listening to the scientists about the virtues of 
peer review! Indeed, even in its scientific applications, peer review is not 
expected to prove any research wrong, but rather to identify flaws and 
deficiencies in a particular research effort that may call into question 
whether the researcher’s conclusions are justified.176 If peer reviewers in 
regulatory settings identify aspects of a regulatory decision not supported 
by science, they have performed this service, and it would be left to the 
agency to explain what nonscientific factors went into filling the gap.177 
But where in the regulatory process can peer review best be applied so as 
to maximize these potential benefits?  
B. Mapping Peer Review Onto Regulation 
Opponents of the “sound science” movement frequently (and we 
believe accurately) point out that the movement’s primary aim seems to be 
to increase the quantity rather than the quality of the agencies’ science—
i.e., to impose on agencies the duty to do science more often rather than to 
use science more carefully.178 Some agencies, of course, engage in pure 
research, and presumably no one is opposed to having those agencies 
undergo scientific peer review. But most regulatory agencies, such as FWS 
in conducting a jeopardy evaluation, are neither expected by law nor 
 174. Gary K. Meffe et al., Independent Scientific Review in Natural Resource Management, 12 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 268, 268 (1998). 
 175. See COMM. ON DEFINING BEST SCIENTIFIC INFO. AVAILABLE FOR FISHERIES MGMT., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE USE OF THE “BEST SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE” 
STANDARD IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 56–57 (2004) (noting that “peer review is the most accepted 
and reliable process for assessing the quality of scientific information. Its use as a quality control 
measure enhances the confidence of the community (including scientists, managers, and stakeholders) 
in the findings presented in scientific reports.”). 
 176. See supra Part II.A. 
 177. By doing so, moreover, regulatory peer review might improve not only the quality of agency 
use of science, but also the quality of agency policy justifications by inducing agencies to make those 
justifications more explicit. Our attention is devoted strictly to the former effect, but scholars studying 
how to improve the transparency and legitimacy of agency policy rationales, see, e.g., Markell, supra 
note 14, may find our proposal beneficial to their cause. 
 178. See Burke, supra note 8, at 512–14; Wagner, Bad Science, supra note 13, at 109–32. 
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equipped by budget to conduct the original research necessary to evaluate 
a decision. In the general sense, therefore, the “sound science” movement 
is truly off the mark. 
Peer review, however, is simply one component of the practice of 
competent science, and it does not directly require researchers to do more 
science. It is quality control, not quantity control. To be sure, the result of 
peer review may be to fault a researcher for shortcutting some aspect of 
research—not enough test runs, too few data points, insufficient control 
procedures, and so on—which may translate into a finding that the 
research design was inadequate. But peer review does not impose arbitrary 
minimum quantities of procedures on researchers. To the extent that an 
agency is candid about the relative contribution of science and policy 
bases in support of a regulatory decision, therefore, regulatory peer review 
focuses exclusively on the science component. Anyone who has in mind 
going further—that is, subjecting the agency’s policy rationales to 
evaluation—is not talking about importing scientific peer review into the 
regulatory process. 
Defined as such, peer review actually maps onto the regulatory process 
in a rather straightforward manner. Using the components of scientific 
peer review introduced above, the following model compares scientific 
peer review to the four stages where science is used in regulatory decision 
making: (1) the search for scientific data; (2) the selection of data (found 
through the search) for use in the decision; (3) the interpretation of the 
selected data in terms relevant to the decision; and (4) the integration of 
that interpretation with whatever other factors the agency must or may 
consider in order to reach a final decision. 
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Stage Scientific Peer Review Regulatory Peer Review 
Search  What was the quality of the 
research design and data 
collection procedures? 
Did the agency consult 
appropriate sources of data and 
scientific research on the issue 
for decision? 
Selection  Were the methods for testing 
the hypothesis appropriate and 
robust? 
Did the agency appropriately 
select data and research 
identified in the search? 
Interpretation To what extent are the 
conclusions supported by the 
analysis of the data? 
Did the agency draw appropriate 
scientific conclusions from the 
data and research it selected? 
Integration Not relevant—science is the 
exclusive source of the 
conclusions drawn in 
scientific research. 
Not applied—although the 
agency might use other sources 
to reach its regulatory decision, 
regulatory peer review stops at 
evaluation of the agency’s 
interpretation of the selected data 
and research. 
To illustrate more concretely how this model operates, consider the 
decision FWS and NOAA must make, once they have listed a species, on 
whether to designate “critical habitat” for the species. Section 4(a)(3) 
requires the agencies, within certain time frames, and only “to the 
maximum extent prudent and determinable,” to “designate any habitat of 
such species which is . . . considered to be critical habitat.”179 Section 
3(5)(A)(i) defines critical habitat as “specific areas within the geographic 
area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . , on which are 
found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation 
of the species and (II) which may require special management 
considerations or protection.”180 Areas outside the geographic range of the 
species may be designated if they are “essential for the conservation of the 
species.”181 These determinations must be made “on the basis of the best 
scientific data available.”182 In either case, however, the agency must 
“tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, the impact on national 
security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying a particular area as 
critical habitat.”183 Taking those impacts into consideration, the agency 
“may exclude any area from critical habitat if . . . the benefits of such 
 
 
 179. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000). 
 180. § 1532(5)(A)(i). 
 181. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).  
 182. § 1533(b)(2). 
 183. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(2) (Supp. 2005).  
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exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the 
critical habitat.”184 However, this impact analysis may not be used to 
exclude an area if the agency “determines, based on the best scientific and 
commercial data available, that the failure to designate such area as critical 
habitat will result in the extinction of the species concerned.”185
This snarl of science and policy decisions can be unpacked into its 
discrete components as follows. 
• Step One—Science: What is the geographic range of the species 
and which areas within and outside that range contain biological 
or physical features essential to the conservation of the species? 
• Step Two—Policy: Which areas identified in Step One that are 
within the geographic range require special management 
consideration or protection? 
• Step Three—Policy: What are the economic and other impacts 
of designating areas that are candidates for designation after 
conclusion of Step One and Step Two? 
• Step Four—Policy: Does the impact analysis from Step Three 
provide a basis for excluding candidate areas from designation, 
on the ground that the social and economic benefits of exclusion 
outweigh the benefits to the species of designation? 
• Step Five—Science: Would exclusion of any areas based on 
Step Four lead to the extinction of the species? 
• Step Six—Policy: Is there any other reason why designation 
would not be prudent? 
This is depicted graphically as a flow chart on the following page. 
 184. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).  
 185. Id. 
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Step Five: Would exclusion of any 
areas based on Step Four lead to the 
extinction of the species? 
Step Three: What are the economic 
and other impacts of designating 
areas that are candidates for 
designation after conclusion of Step 
One and Step Two? 
Step Four: Does the impact analysis 
from Step Three provide a basis for 
excluding candidate areas from 
designation, on the ground that the 
social and economic benefits of 
exclusion outweigh the benefits to 
the species of designation? 
Step Two: Which areas identified in 
Step One that are within the 
geographic range require special 
management consideration or 
protection? 
Step One: What is the geographic 
range of the species and which areas 
within and outside that range contain 
biological or physical features 
essential to the conservation of the 
species? 
Step Six: Is there any other reason 
why designation would not be 
prudent? 
Step Five: Would exclusion of any 
areas based on Step Four lead to the 
extinction of the species? 
Science 
Step Two: Which areas identified in 
Step One that are within the 
geographic range require special 
management consideration or 
protection? 
Policy 
Step Four: Does the impact analysis 
from Step Three provide a basis for 
excluding candidate areas from 
designation, on the ground that the 
social and economic benefits of 
exclusion outweigh the benefits to 
the species of designation? 
Policy 
Step Three: What are the economic 
and other impacts of designating 
areas that are candidates for 
designation after conclusion of Step 
One and Step Two? 
Policy 
Step Six: Is there any other reason 
why designation would not be 
prudent? 
Policy 
Step One: What is the geographic 
range of the species and which areas 
within and outside that range 
contain biological or physical 
features essential to the conservation 
of the species? 
Science 
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Regulatory peer review, as we suggest it should be constructed, would 
not apply to any step designated as a policy question. Rather, only Step 
One and Step Five in our configuration of the critical habitat decision tree 
require the agency to search for, select, and interpret scientific data and 
research. Regulatory peer review applied to those two stages of the 
decision making process would engage in the following kinds of inquiry: 
Peer Review Focus Scope of Peer Review Inquiry 
Agency’s search for 
data and research 
What steps did the agency take to locate available 
scientific data and research? Did the agency perform a 
literature survey of relevant journal publications? Did 
the agency solicit information from researchers with 
relevant expertise at universities, other agencies, and 
private research sources? Was the scope of the search 
appropriate—e.g., if information about the species in 
question is limited, did the agency search for data and 
research about similar species?  
Agency’s selection of 
data and research 
identified in its search 
How did the agency evaluate the quality of available 
data to select the “best available” as required by 
statute? Did the agency employ appropriate methods 
for determining the relative quality of the data and 
research sources identified in its search? Did the 
agency exclude any data or research for inappropriate 
reasons? Did the agency rely on data or research of 
questionable reliability?  
Agency’s interpretation 
of data and research 
selected 
Are the agency’s conclusions about the geographic 
range of the species, biological and physical features 
essential to the conservation of the species, and the 
threat of extinction if specific areas were excluded from 
designation all justified based on the peer reviewer’s 
assessment of the data and research the agency should 
have selected? Did the agency make appropriate 
conclusions about what were the “maximum 
determinable” aspects of each of these inquiries?  
None of these questions strikes us as inconsistent with the type of 
inquiry conducted in scientific peer review. Nor do they strike us as 
inappropriate questions to ask of an agency purporting to base its 
regulatory decision in any significant part on science. These questions, if 
rigorously pursued, would likely lead reviewers to detect cases in which 
an agency attempted to oversell what its scientific case supports, and thus 
would be likely to encourage agencies to be more careful in their search 
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for, selection, and interpretation of scientific data and research. Scientific 
peer review, in other words, maps quite nicely onto the regulatory process 
to produce regulatory peer review.  
C. Avoiding Drag 
And what of the legitimate concern over making agencies jump 
through more hoops? Our formulation of regulatory peer review focuses 
on the quality of the agency’s use of science, not the quantity of how much 
science it conducts. As previously noted, achieving quality in the use of 
science may require some agencies to do more work than they have in the 
past—conduct broader literature searches, deliberate more over relative 
quality of data, spend more time analyzing the data and research—but if 
an agency presents any of its work as scientific in quality, there is a 
minimum standard it must meet to do so credibly. Asking agencies to 
substantiate their scientific claims ought not strike anyone as repugnant to 
appropriate administrative procedures.  
As to the concern that regulatory peer review imposes unrealistic 
burdens of proof, that also is not the case under our formulation of the 
process. Regulatory peer review does not import the default scientific 
burden of proof: that the data support the conclusion within a 95% level of 
confidence. Rather, regulatory peer review imports the standards of proof 
prescribed in the relevant statutory program. In the critical habitat 
designation procedure, for example, regulatory peer review would be 
conducted within the statutory directives that the agency consider only the 
“best scientific data available” and reach conclusions based on what is the 
“maximum determinable” from that body of information.  
Finally, as to the concern that regulatory peer review will unduly 
impede and interfere with agencies’ policy deliberations, that is the least 
likely effect under the formulation we propose. The unyielding boundary 
of regulatory peer review stops at the line between agency interpretation of 
available data and research and integration of the agency’s scientific 
conclusions with other factors in the decision making procedure. Indeed, if 
regulatory peer review produces any improvement in the quality of 
agencies’ use of science, which we believe it would, it should only 
improve agencies’ policy deliberations by providing more confidence in 
the scientific input and more explicit delineation between what is science 
and what is policy in the justification the agency presents for its final 
decision. 
Nevertheless, we do recognize that regulatory peer review must be 
conducted properly if it is to be conducted at all. Wendy Wagner and 
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others have argued persuasively that sham regulatory peer review may 
actually prove counterproductive by helping agencies overstate the extent 
of support they derive from science by giving policy decisions the 
appearance of a scientific exercise.186 Moreover, regulatory peer review 
will take time and money to conduct, resources that may be taken away 
from other important agency functions. Both are legitimate concerns. Peer 
review can be misused, just as science can be misused. The answer to both 
concerns is the same: design matters. Accordingly, we next outline a 
proposal for implementing regulatory peer review which we believe would 
yield all the major benefits without compromising effectiveness.  
VI. A PROPOSED MODEL OF RANDOMIZED PEER REVIEW 
This Article has set out the main arguments in favor of and opposed to 
regulatory peer review, described the major peer review initiatives in 
Congress and OMB, and looked at how we should think about peer 
review, all leading to three key points. First, peer review can improve 
agency decision making based on the use and interpretation of scientific 
data, but, second, how many agency decisions actually would be improved 
by peer review is unknown. And this matters because, third, the practice of 
peer review imposes costs. The policy question thus becomes how we can 
capture the benefits of regulatory peer review at lowest cost to improve 
overall agency decision quality. In our view, none of the major peer 
review proposals provides an adequate answer.  
The ESA legislation assumes that virtually all agency decisions 
increasing species protection warrant regulatory peer review.187 This 
approach is senselessly over-inclusive (imposing peer review on all ESA 
protection measures would significantly weaken the statute’s ability to 
conserve biodiversity) as well as under-inclusive (de-listing decisions and 
incidental take permits also rely on scientific data but would not be subject 
to peer review). Indeed, even though most of our survey respondents 
favored regulatory peer review, over two-thirds of the respondents 
opposed applying it to all regulatory decisions of an agency.  
The OMB proposal, which became effective in December, 2004, 
implicitly recognizes that subjecting all agency information products to 
peer review imposes too many costs. Thus it mandates peer review for 
data that could have a substantial impact on important public policies, 
agency decisions that impose private sector impact of over $500 million, 
 186. See, e.g., Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 13, at 1700. 
 187. See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text. 
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and decisions that involve precedent-setting, novel and complex 
approaches.188 A slim majority—55 percent—of our survey respondents 
favored this approach. Nevertheless, while these thresholds do provide 
cut-off points, they could also screen out many discrete regulatory actions 
from consideration. The OMB proposal seems to either assume that these 
actions would not benefit from peer review (which seems questionable) or 
that review would prove too expensive. It is also worth noting that OMB’s 
guidelines assume that if an agency relies on peer-reviewed research, the 
need for peer review is eliminated. This highlights the ultimate 
shortcoming of the OMB guidelines—peer review is required only for 
“information products,” not for how the agencies use the “information 
products” in their regulatory decisions.189 If OMB cares about improving 
the quality of regulatory decisions and not just the information products, 
which seems to be the case given the threshold standards, its guidelines do 
so only in an indirect manner.190 By focusing on information products and 
excluding peer-reviewed research, the key steps of search, selection, and 
interpretation set out in Section V are missed. By focusing only on the 
quality of the information agencies use, it is not at all clear that the OMB 
Guidelines will, or can, effectively address whether the agency 
appropriately interpreted and applied the information. 
The peer review critics’ counter-proposals are unsatisfying as well. 
Groups calling for no peer review at all either deny that any agency 
decisions would benefit from peer review or claim that, in any case, the 
medicine will prove worse than the disease. Sidney Shapiro takes a more 
nuanced approach, recommending that agencies be allowed to employ ad 
hoc procedures for deciding when peer review is appropriate.191 Given the 
self-serving experiences of FWS, NOAA, and OMB with peer review, 
however,192 there is little reason to be optimistic that the quality-control 
benefits of peer review would endure. If these agencies’ experiences 
provide any guide, the legitimacy of peer review would be undermined by 
agency discretion and self-interest in its application. In his comment letter 
on behalf of the Center for Progressive Regulation, Shapiro offers a 
 188. See supra notes 105–17 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2665 (Jan. 14, 
2005). 
 190. Given the wording of the Data Quality Act, OMB likely had no choice but to restrict its 
guidelines to information products. Shapiro, supra note 25, at 10,066–68. 
 191. Letter from Sidney A. Shapiro, Bd. Member and Treasurer, Ctr. for Progressive Regulation, 
to Dr. Margo Schwab, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget 5–6 (May 27, 
2004), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/shapiro_omb.pdf. 
 192. See supra notes 140–48, 150–53 and accompanying text. 
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different proposal, that OMB should “limit peer review to circumstances 
where scientific assessments set a new precedent or are reasonably 
controvertible.”193 This proposal was largely adopted in the revised OMB 
proposal described above, but it focuses more on the nature of the data 
than the nature of the decision, which is clearly where the interest lies in 
regulatory peer review.  
If all of these proposals have serious shortcomings, is there a better 
approach? We believe there is, but to explain why one needs to return to 
first principles. In order to craft a peer review policy, we need to be clear 
about what the most significant benefits of peer review are. Debate and 
scholarship to date have largely focused on three types of benefits. The 
most obvious is quality control. Hence the descriptions of peer review as a 
“second opinion” that catches mistakes in the original decision’s use of 
science or as an expert filter that catches bias or theory protection in the 
original decision.194 This is closely linked to the legitimizing function of 
peer review. As OMB has argued, peer review can promote greater public 
confidence in agency use of science.195 This is the reason most scientists 
believe that peer review is “essential to the integrity of scientific and 
scholarly communication.”196 Peer review also serves a deliberative 
function, providing for give and take between proponent and reviewers.197  
Serious debate continues over how substantial these potential benefits 
are, however, because of significant uncertainty with respect to how often 
agencies overstate the extent of scientific support for their regulatory 
decisions. Implicit in the arguments of Representative Walden and OMB 
is the assumption that agencies do overstate support frequently enough to 
justify making peer review commonplace. Otherwise their proposals 
would be pointless, requiring extensive reviews to address a negligible 
problem. Critics of these proposals similarly argue that the problems 
surrounding agencies’ use of science have been exaggerated. As noted in 
the Introduction, though, it is simply not clear how many Klamaths are out 
there.  
 193. Shapiro, supra note 191, at 5–6.  
 194. Quality control is equally important in the context of journal peer review. Rowland’s study of 
scientists’ perceptions of peer review found that “[i]t is widely agreed that this improving function by 
referees is of value in maintaining the overall quality of the scholarly literature.” ROWLAND, supra 
note 32, at 1. 
 195. See Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,024 
(Sept. 15, 2003). 
 196. WELLER, supra note 29, at 322. 
 197. This is particularly evident in journal peer review, in which approximately 80% of submitted 
papers are in the “publishable with amendments and improvements” category. ROWLAND, supra note 
32, at 1. 
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Yet this ignorance forms the basis for our proposal, for regulatory peer 
review offers a potential benefit that no one has talked about—its 
diagnostic function. Neither advocates nor critics of regulatory peer review 
can intelligently assess the merits of requiring it—whether restricted to 
major decisions, decisions that create precedent, or decisions that protect 
species—without first having a clear sense of whether none, a few, or 
many of these decisions would benefit from peer review. Yet this critically 
important issue has received little consideration in the current debate.198 
The greatest benefit of peer review may lie in providing empirical data on 
the scope of the problem that can then tell us whether broader or reduced 
use of peer review is warranted.199
To capture all the benefits outlined above, we propose a model of 
Randomized Peer Review with three discrete stages: 
Stage One: Target Decisions 
 First identify classes of regulatory decisions that would likely 
benefit from peer review. This would include types of agency 
decisions that rely on scientific data and scientific judgments 
(similar to the description of the critical habitat designation decision 
shown in Part IV). Within this broad class of decisions, randomly 
select a subset of specific regulatory decisions within a six-month 
period.200 To commence, we would suggest following the IRS audit 
practice of selecting roughly 1-2% of the eligible decisions.201
 198. The Natural Resources Defense Council, it should be noted, asked OMB to shelve its 
proposal and assemble a panel of experts on peer review to assess whether existing practices are a 
problem. Monique Waples, Comment on Peer Review Standards, (Dec. 23, 2003), http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/72.pdf 
 199. Professors Doremus and Tarlock recognize that “[e]ffective outside reviews can also spur 
learning, by inspiring new thinking, demanding accountability, and highlighting gaps in the existing 
data base that could be filled.” Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 16, at 33. We are suggesting that peer 
review also spurs learning about the quality of agency practices in general. 
 200. The OMB proposal also focuses on information that will have an important impact on public 
policies or an impact of more than $500 million per year. See supra notes 105–17 and accompanying 
text. We believe that focusing on science underpinning discrete regulatory decisions is more 
appropriate because, at its core, this is really what parties on both sides of the sound science debate 
care about—whether the science underpinning agency decisions is accurate and properly interpreted. 
 201. As regulators well know, deterrent effects can be realized even when compliance inspections 
are conducted less than 100% of the time for fewer than 100% of the regulated facilities. The number 
of reviews, of course, could not exceed the review budget, which would ultimately determine the 
percent used. In 2005, for example, the IRS audited only 0.93% of all individual returns. By contrast, 
roughly one in five large corporations (with returns of $10 million and over) were audited. See Posting 
of Charles Rubin to http://www.rubinontax.blogspot.com/2006/03/latest-irs-audit-data.html (Mar. 28, 
2006, 18:08 EST). 
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Stage Two: Peer Review Decisions 
 The peer review of the science underpinning these decisions 
would be conducted by groups of three experts selected from 
standing panels established by the NRC. Peer reviewers would be 
compensated in order to attract competent experts and encourage 
timely performance, vetted for potential bias by the NRC through its 
standard practice, appointed for a limited term, and kept anonymous 
to the decision making agency except in cases in which the 
reviewers’ desire to conduct field investigation and interviews 
precludes anonymity.202 The peer review committees would not be 
asked to conduct a de novo review of the agency’s entire record and 
decision. Rather, the committee would be asked to evaluate the 
agency’s protocol for identifying relevant scientific data and 
research, its rationale for selecting and prioritizing data and research 
from the identified pool, and its interpretation of this body of 
science. When necessary, the peer reviewers could request 
important data compilations or research reports relied upon by the 
agency in making these evaluations. The peer review would be 
completed in no more than ninety days and would not be subject to 
the public meeting and other procedural requirements of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act.203  
Stage Three: Disseminate and Analyze Reviews 
 The results of the peer review would be released to the agency 
and the public prior to the conclusion of any public notice and 
comment procedures applicable to the underlying decision. After a 
period of two years, and every two years thereafter, the overall 
results of the peer reviews conducted for a particular agency and 
regulatory program (e.g., designations of critical habitat) would be 
assessed to determine whether the audit rate is appropriate and, 
more generally, whether the agency’s use of science warrants the 
mandatory or more intensive practice of regulatory peer review. 
How well does this proposal capture the benefits yet minimize the costs 
of regulatory peer review? For those decisions that are reviewed, the 
proposal ensures quality control in particular cases. Based on the IRS 
 202. See supra note 147. 
 203. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–11 (2000). 
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experience, the randomized aspect of the proposal is intended to create a 
general deterrent effect, ensuring agency officials understand that their 
decision may become subject to peer review. Through this approach, the 
benefits of regulatory peer review will be more institutional in nature than 
identifiable in discrete cases. In other words, if the audit rate is high 
enough, the prospect of peer review would inherently lead agencies to 
think twice about their use of science in making decisions. Such a 
regulatory peer review framework may not substantially change the 
outcome of many regulatory decisions, but it would beneficially influence 
the way in which regulatory decisions are carried out. The proposal also 
helps further legitimize agency decisions, ensuring a transparent process, 
independent of agency influence, that the use of science was appropriate. 
It promotes the deliberative function of peer review, furnishing an 
independent, expert review of an agency decision that the agency can 
consider in its final determination. And, perhaps most importantly, it 
provides a way to empirically diagnose whether agency use of science 
really should be of concern and to finally answer how many Klamaths are 
out there. 
But what of the downsides? As noted earlier, paralysis by analysis is a 
real concern for resource-strapped agencies working under tight deadlines. 
At some point, the quest for relevant, reliable, and reviewed data may add 
so much time to the decision making process that the policy effectiveness 
of the decision is impeded. What a hollow victory it would be, for 
example, to spend so much time ensuring the reliability of the data proving 
a species is endangered, yet find the species extinct by the time the 
decision to protect it is finally made. Adding time and budget constraints 
to the picture amplifies the prospect and potential intensity of these 
conflicting constraints. Optimal decision making, in other words, requires 
that we intentionally operate at an optimal level of ignorance, 
understanding that comprehensive peer review would be counter-
productive.204  
Our proposal has its costs, to be sure, but they are significantly less 
than those of other proposals. If a 1-2% audit rate can serve as a 
meaningful general deterrent and provide an accurate sample for analysis, 
the most important benefits of more comprehensive review requirements 
can be satisfied at a fraction of the cost.205 Appropriating funds for the 
 204. For discussion of the conflicting constraints property of complex systems, and of regulatory 
systems in particular, see J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of 
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 806–12 (2003).  
 205. In order to make these decisions, more information would be needed on the likely costs and 
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NRC rather than the target agencies to pay for the reviews would also 
ensure that agencies are not forced to sacrifice other activities in order to 
carry out reviews.  
And what about concerns that the peer review process will become 
politicized or captured? Our proposal represents a measured approach that 
enhances regulatory peer review but puts the decision about whether to use 
it and how to conduct it outside of the agencies’ control—and in the hands 
of a generally respected neutral player. Although many stakeholders 
disagreed with the Klamath Committee’s conclusions and how the 
Departments of Interior and Commerce incorporated them into policy,206 
no allegations were heard that the committee somehow was influenced by 
bias. The same cannot be said of peer reviews that have been carried out 
under the peer review policy FWS and NOAA have used for their ESA 
decisions.207  
Our model of Randomized Peer Review also raises a series of 
important administrative law questions. The first is how the agency should 
use the reviews. This could range from treating the review no differently 
than a comment letter from the general public to requiring an agency 
response explaining why it has or has not revised its decision consistent 
with the peer review results.208 In either case, the review would become 
part of the administrative record for purposes of any judicial challenge. 
The more difficult question turns on what role the peer review should play 
if the agency decision is later challenged as arbitrary and capricious. Here 
again, the court’s treatment of the review could range from giving it no 
special status to giving it the heightened deference accorded to views 
expressed by sister agencies.209
In our view, the peer review report should be treated no differently than 
public submissions through the notice and comment process of informal 
rulemaking. Given the intense light and heat surrounding the sound 
number of reviews. It is worth noting that, for a fraction of its $650,000 total budget, the Klamath 
Committee was able within ninety days to conclude its initial peer review of the agency decisions.  
 206. See MOONEY, supra note 13, at 152–54. 
 207. See supra Part IV.B. 
 208. The agencies’ existing peer review policy does not require this, and the agencies often are not 
forthcoming about why they agree or disagree with their (hand-picked) peer reviewers. See, e.g., 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to List the 
Mountain Plover as Threatened, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,083, 53,093 (Sept. 9, 2003) (after confirming the 
merits of a proposed rule to list the mountain plover that was supported in two rounds of peer review, 
FWS later withdrew the rule based ostensibly on new information, but without additional peer review).  
 209. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1031 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(criticizing the Corps for disregarding negative comments in the environmental impact statement by 
the Fish and Wildlife Agency).  
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science debate, simple political expediency would likely force the 
agency’s hand. It would be a cocky agency director, indeed, who simply 
ignored a critical peer review report (and likely a director who did not 
mind traveling up to Capitol Hill to explain to skeptical Senators why the 
agency’s actions were contrary to the peer review). Similarly, we see no 
need for the court to grant special deference to the review. In many cases 
involving peer review the agency will be making decisions in the face of 
scientific uncertainty. Upsetting the tendency of courts to defer to the 
agency’s choice in close-call cases—when some evidence exists in the 
record to support a decision in either direction and the statute imposes no 
default position—strikes us as unwarranted.210 Fundamentally, it must be 
remembered, the purpose of peer review is to improve agency decision 
quality, not to arm litigants or undermine agency discretion. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Agency use of peer review processes is neither new nor, until recently, 
particularly controversial, yet it has not been widely used in regulatory 
settings. The Klamath saga, the OMB mandate for peer review of 
“information products” across the federal government, and the obvious 
legislative attempts to bind the regulatory arms of the ESA through peer 
review, however, have fundamentally changed the landscape. The ensuing 
debate has generated inflated claims over the use of peer review in 
regulatory settings as either a golden virtue or a sinister evil.  
We have sought to show that regulatory peer review can meaningfully 
improve agency decisions that rely on the use or interpretation of scientific 
information, but that this alone tells us nothing about whether peer review 
should therefore become part and parcel of agency decision processes. We 
believe it is unwarranted and may well prove unwise to mandate peer 
review across the board for agency actions, such as the preparation of 
“information products” or the promulgation of rules or decisions based on 
such information, without a clear understanding of the real extent of the 
problem peer review is supposed to address. In proposing an approach of 
randomized peer review, we seek to shift the debate away from whether 
regulatory peer review is good or bad, or whether agencies are biased or 
not, and on to a more productive, empirically grounded vantage from 
which we can more intelligently assess the proper role for this process in 
agency settings. 
 210. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
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